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INTRODUCTION 
Precedent poses a notoriously difficult problem for originalists.  
Some decisions thought inconsistent with the Constitution’s original 
public meaning are so well baked into government that reversing 
them would wreak havoc.  Adherence to originalism arguably re-
quires, for example, the dismantling of the administrative state, the 
invalidation of paper money, and the reversal of Brown v. Board of Ed-
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ucation.1 Originalists have been pressed to either acknowledge that 
their theory could generate major disruption or identify a principled 
exception to their insistence that judges are bound to enforce the 
Constitution’s original public meaning. 
Commentators, who typically approach matters with the courts in 
mind, tend to frame this problem as one for a Supreme Court Justice.  
It might, however, be more acute for a member of Congress.  The 
standard hypothetical posits an originalist Justice forced to choose 
between principled adherence to original meaning and compro-
mised adherence to precedent.  Yet at least in the case of so-called 
“super precedents”—decisions that no serious person would propose 
to undo even if they are wrong—an originalist justice will not have to 
choose between fidelity and faint-heartedness.  No one is likely to ask 
the Supreme Court to rethink arguably nonoriginalist decisions like 
the constitutionality of the Social Security Administration, paper 
money, or segregated public schools—and if anyone did ask, the 
Court would deny certiorari. 
An originalist member of Congress, by contrast, might have a 
harder time avoiding the conflict between original meaning and 
precedent.  Congress has to decide whether to fund the Social Securi-
ty Administration,2 to seat the elected representatives of the arguably 
unconstitutional state of West Virginia,3 and to rely on the Section 
Five power conferred by the possibly illegitimate Fourteenth 
Amendment.4  If an honest originalist must reject precedent in situa-
tions like these (assuming she decides that they are indeed unconsti-
 
 1 We do not want our choice of examples to obscure our argument.  We identify some well-
settled precedents whose consistency with the original public meaning has been chal-
lenged, but we recognize that different readers will reach different conclusions about 
whether any given precedent in fact conflicts with the text.  We do not ourselves under-
take to examine how any of the precedents we mention would fare under an originalist 
analysis.  For our purposes, it is sufficient to say that it is inevitable that some well-settled 
precedents conflict with the original public meaning, and we use the familiar examples 
simply to illustrate the nature of the problem posed by such a conflict.  See infra notes 34–
47 and accompanying text. 
 2 See Erin Mershon, Ron Paul Admits He’s On Social Security, Even Though He Believes It’s Un-
constitutional, HUFFINGTON POST (June 21, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2012/06/20/ronpaulsocialsecurity_n_1612117.html (explaining Ron Paul’s stance that 
Social Security and Medicare should not be eliminated “despite his belief that the pro-
grams are unconstitutional”). 
 3 See generally Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is West Virginia Constitutional?, 90 
CALIF. L. REV. 293 (2002) (exploring originalist arguments that the admission of West 
Virginia to the United States did not comply with the Constitution). 
 4 See generally Thomas B. Colby, Originalism and the Ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
107 NW. U. L. REV. 1627 (2013) (arguing that irregularities in the ratification of the Four-
teenth Amendment pose a problem for originalism). 
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tutional), adherence to originalism is a recipe for folly, ending in 
electoral failure.  If honest originalism does not require this result, 
the originalist must say why. 
In undertaking to answer that question, this Article proceeds as 
follows.  Part I adopts the position that the original public meaning of 
the Constitution is the law.  Early originalists sometimes presented 
originalism as a theory of judging—specifically, as a mechanism of 
judicial restraint.  On this view, which is suffused with worries about 
the counter-majoritarian nature of judicial review, the original public 
meaning of the Constitution would have no particular claim on the 
conscientious legislator.  The conventional position of modern 
originalists, however, is that the original public meaning of the Con-
stitution’s text is “the law.”  The consequence of that position is that 
the original public meaning of the Constitution binds the legislators 
who swear to uphold it. 
Part II recounts why nonoriginalist precedent tests the originalist 
commitment to the binding force of the Constitution’s original pub-
lic meaning.  It also explains why framing the super precedent prob-
lem as one about the obligations of a Supreme Court Justice, rather 
than one about the obligations of political actors, obscures the issue 
at stake.  The issue is not, as is commonly assumed, a matter of stare 
decisis: the force of these super precedents derives not from the 
Court’s decision to afford them precedential strength but from the 
People’s choice to accept them.  Once a precedent is deeply rooted, 
challenges die out and the Court is no longer required to deal with 
the question of the precedent’s correctness.  The rules of adjudica-
tion, moreover—including the Court’s practice of answering only the 
questions presented in the petition for certiorari—relieve the Court 
of any obligation to identify and correct any error that may lurk in a 
case.  The Court employs a variety of techniques that permit it to as-
sume the correctness of some background issues and focus its atten-
tion on the ones that are actually controverted.  The upshot is that 
the Court need not confront the question whether foundational 
precedent ought to be overruled. 
Members of Congress are differently situated.  While the stylized 
process of adjudication narrows the questions presented to the Court, 
in Congress the question of a measure’s constitutionality is always on 
the table.  And because framing constraints do not narrow the rele-
vant and permissible grounds of decision as they do in litigation, 
evaluating a bill’s constitutionality arguably requires analysis of every 
possible constitutional flaw.  That could put the originalist legislator 
in a bind.  After all, if the legislator owes allegiance to the original 
public meaning, it is not obvious why the legislator need not ensure 
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that a bill complies with that meaning in every respect.  Because the 
kinds of procedural outs that permit originalism and deep-seated er-
ror to coexist in courts are not as readily apparent in the legislative 
context, the originalist legislator might have to face questions that an 
originalist justice can escape—such as the constitutionality of the 
administrative state or the legitimacy of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Indeed, broad-brush arguments about the obligation imposed by the 
legislator’s oath of office, combined with the originalist emphasis on 
the preeminence of the text’s original meaning, strongly suggest that 
a member of Congress must do just that. 
We think that is wrong.  Part III contends that it misinterprets the 
duty of fidelity to the text to maintain that Congress (or any individu-
al member) must strip every constitutional question down to the 
studs.  That is not because Congress is obliged to treat precedents as 
the equivalent of the Constitution itself or because longstanding judi-
cial departures from the Constitution function as virtual amend-
ments.  It is because the Constitution permits Congress, much like 
the Supreme Court, to employ techniques of avoidance that keep 
constitutional questions off its agenda. 
We argue that Congress may employ a working presumption that 
super precedents are constitutional and thereby refrain from re-
examining them.  Presuming that a super precedent is correct is dif-
ferent from endorsing its correctness.  If the precedent is erroneous, 
the latter course gives priority to the precedent rather than the origi-
nal meaning.  The former course, however, is a technique for avoid-
ing the question whether the precedent is right or wrong.  Congress 
may assume arguendo that well-settled precedents are correct and fo-
cus its attention on questions that are politically salient.  To be sure, 
Congress is free to reconsider super precedent any time it so chooses.  
The point is simply that a commitment to the primacy of the original 
meaning does not force Congress to reconsider super precedent 
when it has no interest in doing so.  If the Court is likely to revisit su-
per precedent only in response to litigants, Congress is likely to do so 
only in response to constituents—which is to say that as a practical 
matter, the People decide whether and when Congress should initiate 
correction of a deep-seated constitutional error. 
Any theory of constitutional interpretation must be able to ac-
commodate error because mistakes are an inevitable part of any hu-
man institution.  It is more difficult for originalism to account for er-
rors than other theories, because most originalists insist that the 
Constitution’s original meaning is binding law that cannot be over-
come by other considerations, including pragmatic ones.  This has 
led originalist scholars to search for ways to justify treating constitu-
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tional mistakes as the functional equivalent of constitutional law.  Yet 
public officials need not make that choice at all.  Stability is built into 
the constitutional structure because the Constitution does not re-
quire them to identify, much less rectify, every constitutional mistake.  
It permits some errors to exist unexamined.  Politics, not legal duty, 
determines whether Congress reconsiders the soundness of super 
precedent. 
I.  ORIGINALISM IN CONGRESS 
A.  Originalism as a Theory of Law 
Originalism is characterized by a commitment to two core princi-
ples.5  First, the meaning of the constitutional text is fixed at the time 
of its ratification.6  Second, the historical meaning of the text “has le-
gal significance and is authoritative in most circumstances.”7  Com-
mitment to these two principles marks the most significant disagree-
ment between originalists and their critics.  A nonoriginalist may take 
the text’s historical meaning as a relevant data point in interpreting 
the demands of the Constitution, but other considerations, like social 
justice or contemporary values, might overcome it. 8  For an original-
ist, by contrast, the historical meaning of the text is a hard constraint.  
Throughout the Article, when we refer to the originalist commitment 
to “text,” we mean text as originalists interpret it—i.e., in accordance 
with its original public meaning. 
 
 5 See Keith E. Whittington, Originalism: A Critical Introduction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 378 
(2013) (“The two crucial components of originalism are the claims that constitutional 
meaning was fixed at the time of the textual adoption and that the discoverable historical 
meaning of the constitutional text has legal significance and is authoritative in most cir-
cumstances.”); Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 
NW. U. L. REV. 923, 944–45 (2009) (describing the core claims of originalism).  While 
originalists hold these convictions in common, there are other matters about which they 
disagree: for example, there is disagreement about the rationale for originalism and the 
legitimacy of “constitutional construction.”  See Whittington, supra, at 394–404 (detailing 
the “points of contention” between originalists).  These differences are unimportant for 
present purposes. 
 6 See Whittington, supra note 5, at 394–-404 (explaining the originalist position that consti-
tutional meaning is fixed at the time the text is adopted).  The dominant view among 
modern originalists is that the text should be interpreted with reference to its original 
public meaning rather than the private intentions of those who drafted it.  See id. at 380 
(“Originalist theory has now largely coalesced around original public meaning as the 
proper object of interpretive inquiry.”). 
 7 Id. at 378.  Originalists disagree about why the historical meaning constrains and when, if 
ever, the interpreter can depart from the historical meaning.  See id. 
 8 See id. at 406–08 (describing the disagreement between originalists and nonoriginalists 
about the authoritativeness of the original public meaning). 
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Originalists, like most constitutional theorists, focus almost exclu-
sively on constitutional interpretation in the Supreme Court.  Wheth-
er a legislator is legally bound by the Constitution’s original public 
meaning depends upon whether originalism is a theory of constitu-
tional law or a theory of adjudication.9  The former is a theory about 
what counts as constitutional law, and the latter is a theory about how 
judges should decide cases.  There is no necessary correlation be-
tween the two.  One might reject the proposition that the original 
public meaning of the Constitution’s text itself constitutes the law but 
nonetheless think that judges should enforce only the original public 
meaning of the text in the service of a value like judicial restraint.  
On this view, originalism is not so much a theory of constitutional law 
as a theory about how to exercise judicial review.  It reflects a policy 
choice about how an institution comprised of unelected, life-tenured 
judges should enforce the Constitution, but in a different institution-
al context, one subscribing to originalism as a theory of adjudication 
might make a different judgment.10  Congress is a pragmatic decision-
making institution comprised of members who are responsive to the 
 
 9 Cf. Mitchell N. Berman & Kevin Toh, On What Distinguishes New Originalism from Old: A 
Jurisprudential Take, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 557 (2013) (distinguishing between theo-
ries of adjudication, which address “how judges should behave,” and theories of constitu-
tional law, which are concerned with identifying “the ultimate determinants of the con-
tents of constitutional norms or propositions”).  There is also a third possibility: some 
offer originalism as a theory of how to interpret language but take no position on wheth-
er the Constitution’s language binds even judges.  Gary Lawson, for example, draws a 
careful distinction between the claim that originalism is the correct way to interpret the 
Constitution and the claim that judges must adhere to the original public meaning of the 
Constitution in deciding cases.  See Gary Lawson, No History, No Certainty, No Legitima-
cy . . . No Problem: Originalism and the Limits of Legal Theory, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1551, 1567 n.53 
(2012) (explaining that “originalism is uniquely the correct way to ascertain the meaning 
of the Constitution” but taking no position on “whether the original meaning of the Con-
stitution should be considered authoritative by judges”); Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes. 
. . and Constitutions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1823, 1824 (1997) (“[A] theory of interpretation allows 
us to determine what the Constitution truly means, while a theory of adjudication allows 
us to determine what role, if any, the Constitution’s meaning should play in particular 
decisions.”).  Given that Lawson does not engage the question whether judges must or 
even should adhere to the original public meaning, his approach does not compel the 
conclusion that legislators are so bound. 
 10 For example, Neal Katyal, while not an originalist, argues that Congress, as a politically 
accountable institution in regular contact with the citizenry, is better able than the courts 
to interpret provisions like the Due Process Clause in a way reflective of contemporary 
values.  Neal Kumar Katyal, Legislative Constitutional Interpretation, 50 DUKE L.J. 1335, 1336 
(2001).  Thus he says that “constitutional interpretation by Congress is, and should be, 
quite different from constitutional interpretation by courts,” with the latter taking a more 
restrained approach and the former taking a “living and evolving” approach.  Id. at 1335, 
1341.  A “restrained approach” is not necessarily an originalist approach, but the argu-
ment highlights how one’s theory of adjudication may be distinct from one’s theory of 
what is fairly encompassed by the Constitution itself. 
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desires of the people they represent, and a theory designed to ensure 
that judges defer to legislative majorities would not necessarily make 
sense in the context of the body that expresses what those majorities 
want. 
To be sure, when a legislative act is subject to judicial review, 
things might run smoothest if Congress and the courts are on the 
same page.  If a legislator committed to originalism in adjudication 
got the courts she preferred, she might assume an originalist perspec-
tive to predict whether a given statute would survive judicial review.11  
But the situation would be different if the courts were largely non-
originalist or the legislative act was immune from judicial review.  
Then someone committed to originalism as a theory of adjudication 
might think it permissible for legislators to make the kind of all-
things-considered constitutional judgment that is off-limits to a judge 
constrained by original meaning.  Thus, one attracted to originalism 
as a mechanism of judicial restraint might think it permissible for a 
senator to decide whether perjury is a “high crime or misdemeanor” 
with reference to her constituents’ views, regardless whether those 
views conflict with the way the phrase was originally understood.12  
Those constituent views might be part of what counts as constitution-
al law, albeit a part of the law that judges should not enforce. 
Insofar as they grounded their argument for originalism in the 
need for judicial deference to legislative majorities, first-generation 
originalists might have conceived of originalism as a theory of adjudi-
cation.13  Modern originalists, however, have backed away from the 
earlier emphasis on judicial restraint.  As Keith Whittington explains, 
“[t]he primary virtue claimed by the new originalism is one of consti-
tutional fidelity, not of judicial restraint or democratic majoritarian-
ism.”14  Today, most originalists cast the theory as a claim about what 
 
 11 In this predictive posture, Congress would be functioning somewhat like the proverbial 
Holmesian “bad man.”  See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 
991, 994 (1997) (“[I]f we take the view of our friend the bad man we shall find that he 
does not care two straws for the axioms or deductions, but that he does want to know 
what the Massachusetts or English courts are likely to do in fact.”). 
 12 Cf. Katyal, supra note 10, at 1382 (offering the High Crimes and Misdemeanors Clause as 
an example of one that the Senate should interpret with respect to what the public cur-
rently thinks, in contrast to the restrained approach the courts should take to interpreta-
tion in the exercise of judicial review). 
 13 See Berman & Toh, supra note 9, at 560 (maintaining that “first generation originalists 
advocated judicial adherence to some fixed originalist object for reasons that did not de-
pend upon any particular view about the ultimate criteria or determinants of constitu-
tional law”). 
 14 Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 609 (2004). 
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the law is.15  Steven Calabresi and Saikrishna Prakash put it succinctly: 
“Originalists do not give priority to the plain dictionary meaning of 
the Constitution’s text because they like grammar more than history.  
They give priority to it because they believe that it and it alone is law.”16  
Similar statements abound.17  Steven Smith is particularly clear on this 
 
 15 Berman and Toh characterize this as the mainstream neo-originalist position.  Berman & 
Toh, supra note 9, at 574–75.  Not all originalists, however, embrace it.  Gary Lawson takes 
no position on it.  See Lawson, supra note 9 (declining to express a view about whether 
historical meaning binds judges). Moreover, John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport dis-
claim it.  McGinnis and Rappaport do not insist that interpreters should follow the origi-
nal public meaning because it is the law; rather, their argument for originalism is conse-
quentialist.  See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the Good 
Constitution, 98 GEO. L.J. 1693 (2010) (arguing for originalism on the ground the super-
majoritarian process of constitution-making is likely to generate good constitutional law); 
Berman & Toh, supra note 9, at 561 (claiming that McGinnis and Rappaport present their 
argument for originalism as a theory of adjudication rather than a theory of law); Mike 
Rappaport, Should We Follow the Original Meaning Because It Is the Law?, ORIGINALISM BLOG 
(Oct. 24, 2013, 7:59 AM), http://originalismblog.typepad.com/the-originalism-
blog/2013/10/in-response-to-my-priorposton-my-new-book-with-john-mcginnis
originalism-and-the-good-constitution-a-commentator-takes-iss.html (expressing doubt 
that the Constitution’s original meaning is “the law”).  McGinnis and Rappaport extend 
this consequentialist argument to legislators, who, like judges, should adhere to the orig-
inal public meaning not because it is “the law,” but because doing so yields desirable re-
sults.  See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra, at 1697-98 (asserting that the Constitution’s su-
permajoritarian nature “requires interpreters to choose the meaning that gained 
consensus among the Constitution’s enactors”); id. at 1741 n.138 (specifically including 
legislatures in that universe of interpreters because legislatures have a “duty 
to . . . determine the Constitution’s meaning.”); Mike Rappaport, Berman and Toh on the 
New and Old Originalism: Part II—McGinnis and Rappaport, ORIGINALISM BLOG (Dec. 10, 
2013, 8:02 AM), http://originalismblog.typepad.com/the-originalism-blog/2013/12/
berman-and-toh-on-the-new-and-old-originalism-part-ii-mcginnis-and-rappaport.html 
(“The normatively [sic] desirability of the Constitution is not intended as a constraint on 
judges only or principally, but on all actors.”). 
 16 Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 
YALE L.J. 541, 552 (1994) (emphasis added). 
 17 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMM. 291, 292–93 
(2007) (claiming that the Constitution’s original meaning is “binding law”); Vasan 
Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret Drafting 
History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1130 (2003) (“The meaning of the words and phrases of the 
Constitution as law is necessarily fixed as against private assignments of meaning”) (em-
phasis added); Michael W. McConnell, On Reading the Constitution, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 
359, 360–61 (1988) (asserting that constitutional interpretation aims to determine “what 
consistent, coherent rules of law our forefathers laid down for the governance of those 
elected to rule over us”) (emphasis added); Original Intent and a Living Constitution (C-
Span television broadcast Mar. 23, 2010) 15:43 to 18:08, http://ww.c-
spanvideo.org/program/292678-1 (remarks of Justice Scalia) (“The validity of govern-
ment depends upon the consent of the governed . . . [s]o what the people agreed to 
when they adopted the Constitution . . . is what ought to govern us.”); KEITH E. 
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, 
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 111 (1999) (“[O]riginalism both enforces the authoritative decision 
of the people acting as sovereign and, equally important, preserves the possibility of simi-
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point.  According to Smith,  “originalism insists (with some arguable 
lapses . . .) that what counts as law—as valid, enforceable law—is what 
human beings enact, and that the meaning of that law is what those 
human beings understood it to be.”18  As Mitchell Berman and Kevin 
Toh observe, such claims reflect that originalism—at least in its con-
temporary form—“is principally a theory about ‘what counts as 
law.’”19 
Originalism, then, is not a theory about how judges should decide 
cases.  As a theory of law, it makes a claim about the content of the 
law that all public officials—including legislators—must observe.20 
To be sure, many contest originalism’s claim that the Constitu-
tion’s original public meaning constitutes binding law.21  Our project 
does not seek to explore the validity of this claim; instead, we ask 
whether originalism, taken on its own terms, requires Congress to 
bring major disruption to the constitutional landscape.  Of course, 
the answer to that question has something to say about originalism: if 
the answer is yes, originalism is unsustainable in practice no matter 
how persuasive it is in theory. 
B.  Originalism in Congress 
Critics have not challenged the ability of legislators to identify and 
adhere to the Constitution’s original public meaning because 
originalists themselves have paid little attention to how the theory 
might function in Congress.22  Two likely objections come to mind.  
The first echoes general skepticism about a legislator’s capacity to 
engage in conscientious interpretation, and the second questions 
 
lar higher-order decision making by the present and future generations of citizenry.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 18 Steven D. Smith, Reply to Koppelman: Originalism and the (Merely) Human Constitution, 27 
CONST. COMM. 189, 193 (2010). 
 19 Berman & Toh, supra note 9, at 559. 
 20 For discussion of the source of this obligation, see infra Part III.A. 
 21 See generally Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2009) (criticiz-
ing originalism). 
 22 Joel Alicea is a notable exception.  See generally Joel Alicea, Stare Decisis in an Originalist 
Congress, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 797 (2012) (exploring, from an originalist perspec-
tive, whether the arguments in favor of judicial stare decisis carry over to the legislative 
context); José Joel Alicea, Originalism and the Legislature, 56 LOYOLA L. REV. 513 (2010) 
(arguing that the leading justifications for originalism require an originalist Congress, 
not simply an originalist Court); Joel Alicea, An Originalist Congress?, NATIONAL AFFAIRS 
31, 40 (2011) [hereinafter Alicea, An Originalist Congress?] (arguing that lawmakers who 
purport to be originalist need to think through what that commitment requires of them). 
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whether even a conscientious legislator is capable of undertaking an 
originalist inquiry.23 
It is frequently claimed, without respect to any particular interpre-
tive theory, that legislators are incapable of engaging in conscientious 
constitutional interpretation.24  Congress’s critics contend that legisla-
tors lack the time and inclination to study the Constitution, that con-
stitutional arguments are a cover for policy preferences, and that leg-
islators are unlikely to let constitutional constraints thwart a desired 
policy outcome.  One could customize this complaint to originalism 
by insisting that legislators lack the time and inclination to study his-
torical arguments, that historical arguments are a cover for policy 
preferences, and that legislators are unlikely to let the original public 
meaning thwart a desired policy outcome.  We think that skepticism 
about Congress’s capacity to interpret the Constitution is overblown.  
For one thing, evidence exists that Congress can and does interpret 
it.25  For another, Congress has an institutional obligation to do so, 
and every member of Congress has an individual obligation to do so 
by virtue of her oath of office.  An inclination to shirk the obligation 
may reflect upon the quality of Congress’s work, but it cannot excuse 
Congress and its members from a duty the Constitution itself impos-
es. 
Still, some might contend that originalism is an impossibly tall or-
der for even a conscientious legislator.  Probing history is an academ-
ic exercise far afield of the legislator’s typical work, the argument 
might run, while a pragmatic approach involves considerations that 
resemble those made in the policy context.  Eclectic approaches 
might translate well to the legislative context, the critic might say, but 
originalism is an ill fit. 
This argument minimizes the rigor of nonoriginalist constitution-
al interpretation by treating it as roughly equivalent to policymak-
 
 23 The phrase “conscientious legislator” comes from Paul Brest’s famous article.  Paul Brest, 
The Conscientious Legislator’s Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 STAN. L. REV. 585, 587 
(1975). 
 24 See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 
110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1368 (1997) (“[T]here are few examples of Congress subjugating 
its own policy views to its views about constitutional constraints.”); Jeffrey K. Tulis, On 
Congress and Constitutional Responsibility, 89 B.U. L. REV. 515, 516 (2009) (“In the nine-
teenth century, Congress was a site of healthy constitutional contestation, but there has 
been a significant decay over the last century.”). 
 25 For example, the American Law Division of the Congressional Research Service routinely 
responds to congressional requests for analysis of constitutional questions provoked by, 
among other things, proposed legislation.  See Jarrod Shobe, Intertemporal Statutory Interpre-
tation and the Evolution of Legislative Drafting, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 807, 838–43 (2014) (de-
scribing the American Law Division’s role in the legislative process). 
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ing—a characterization that nonoriginalists resist.  History is a stand-
ard modality of constitutional argument.26  Originalists are not 
unique in considering historical meaning; they are unique in treating 
it as conclusive when it is determinate.  Pragmatic approaches also 
account for the historical meaning; they simply permit the interpret-
er more flexibility in deciding how much weight to give it.  Moreover, 
other modalities of constitutional reasoning—for example, the analy-
sis of judicial precedent—may be equally alien to members of Con-
gress.  Interpreting the Constitution inevitably requires legislators to 
step beyond the pragmatic, policy-based arguments with which they 
are most comfortable. 
The prospect of constitutional interpretation in Congress should 
not conjure up an image of a senator or representative poring over 
the United States Reports, much less Farrand’s Records or Elliot’s 
Debates.  Even apart from staff, members of Congress have significant 
resources available to them for the analysis of constitutional issues.  
Most significantly, the nonpartisan American Law Division (“ALD”) 
of the Congressional Research Service routinely generates memoran-
da reflecting sophisticated analysis of constitutional issues that arise 
in the course of Congress’s work.27  Any member of Congress can re-
quest the assistance of the ALD, not to mention the help of her own 
staff.  A duty to make decisions consistent with the Constitution does 
not mean that members have to do the background work themselves.  
They can draw upon analyses their advisors provide in choosing the 
right course. 
Originalist arguments in Congress have a lengthy pedigree.  David 
Currie’s multi-volume study The Constitution in Congress reveals that 
members of Congress repeatedly invoked the Constitution’s original 
public meaning as a constraint upon their decision making.  Currie 
goes so far as to say that throughout the nineteenth century, “just 
about everybody was an originalist.”28  Constitutional arguments in 
Congress thus involved what originalism demanded, not whether 
originalism was the proper interpretive approach.  To cite just one of 
Currie’s examples, when Senators Thomas Hart Benton and John 
Calhoun debated the constitutionality of proposed bankruptcy legis-
 
 26 See generally PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 
(1982) (identifying historical argument as an archetypical form of constitutional argu-
ment). 
 27 See supra note 25. 
 28 DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: DEMOCRATS AND WHIGS 1829–1861 
xiii (2005). 
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lation, they both proceeded from an originalist perspective.29  
Originalist arguments remain prominent in Congress today.  Senators 
Mike Lee and Ted Cruz, for example, are both self-described 
originalists.30  While on the campaign trail, Senator Lee promised, “I 
will not vote for a single bill that I can’t justify based on 
the . . . original understanding of the Constitution, no matter what 
the Court says you can do.”31  In a eulogy for Justice Antonin Scalia, 
Senator Cruz praised Justice Scalia’s focus on “the Constitution as it 
was understood by the people who ratified it and made it the law of 
the land.”32 
None of this is to say that self-professed legislative originalists are 
always faithful to or good at discovering the Constitution’s original 
public meaning.  No matter what the constitutional theory, there is 
room to debate Congress’s sincerity and skill in making constitutional 
arguments.  This is to say, however, that Congress is no stranger to 
originalist arguments.  When Congress considers constitutional ques-
tions, claims that it is constrained by the Constitution’s original 
meaning are typically in the mix.33 
 
 29 Id. at 130. 
 30 Other modern examples include Senator Rand Paul, see Sam Tanenhaus & Jim Ruten-
berg, Rand Paul’s Mixed Inheritance, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/26/us/politics/rand-pauls-mixed-inheritance.html 
(quoting Rand Paul as expressing belief “in a strict, or originalist, interpretation of the 
Constitution”); Representative Jody Hice, see Richard Zimdars, Zimdars: Questions About 
Hice Endorsement, ATHENS BANNER-HERALD (July 18, 2014), http://onlineathens.com/
opinion/2014-07-18/zimdars-questions-about-hice-endorsement (noting that Hice argues 
“for following the Constitution in terms of the original intent of the Founding Fathers as 
the best path for America”); and former Representative David McIntosh, see David M. 
McIntosh, What is Originalism?  Introduction: A View for the Legislative Branch, 19 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 317, 318 (1996) (arguing that Congress should engage in originalist consti-
tutional interpretation). 
 31 Jeffrey Rosen, Radical Constitutionalism, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Nov. 26, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/28/magazine/28FOB-idealab-t.html; see generally 
MIKE LEE, OUR LOST CONSTITUTION: THE WILLFUL SUBVERSION OF AMERICA’S FOUNDING 
DOCUMENT (2015) (urging a return to the Constitution’s original meaning). 
 32 162 CONG. REC. S1436 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 2016) (statement of Sen. Cruz); see also id. at 
S1435 (statement of Sen. Wicker) (praising Justice Scalia as “an icon for constitutional 
originalism”); 152 CONG. REC. S10122 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2006) (statement of Sen. 
Hatch) (“Justice Scalia’s critics attack his judicial philosophy for the same reason he em-
braces it.  Originalism limits a judge’s ability to make law.”). 
 33 In addition to constitutional arguments advanced by Members of Congress themselves, it 
is worth noting that the ALD frequently considers originalist arguments in rendering 
constitutional advice to Congress.  For two of many examples, see JACK MASKELL, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., R41946, QUALIFICATIONS OF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 1–2, 10–15, 18–19 
(2015) (considering the original meaning of constitutional provisions governing qualifi-
cations for and disqualifications from congressional office), and TODD B. TATELMAN, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40124, THE EMOLUMENTS CLAUSE: HISTORY, LAW, AND 
PRECEDENTS 1–5 (2009) (considering the original meaning of the Emoluments Clause). 
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Thinking about originalism from the congressional perspective 
raises many questions, but here we focus on the one that has proven 
most troublesome for those exploring originalism from the judicial 
perspective: how to handle so-called super precedents that conflict 
with the Constitution’s original public meaning.  It turns out that ex-
ploring this question sheds light not only on congressional constitu-
tional interpretation but on originalism itself. 
II.  ORIGINALISM AND THE CHALLENGE OF SUPER PRECEDENT 
Every theory of constitutional interpretation believes that some 
precedents—even well-settled ones—are correct while others are not. 
Originalists, like all interpreters, surely stand ready to overrule some 
precedents that they believe to be incorrect.  But originalists, like 
their counterparts, recognize that there are some mistakes whose cor-
rection would do far more harm than good.  It is highly unlikely, for 
example, that any originalist justice is eager to provoke crisis by de-
claring that paper money is unconstitutional; yet both originalists and 
their critics have assumed that fidelity to the original meaning would 
require a justice to do just that.  In this Part, we examine the nature 
of super precedent and explain why originalist justices can avoid 
causing chaos while still remaining faithful to their principles. 
A.  Super Precedent 
Scholarly debates about stare decisis have paid particular attention 
to so-called “super precedent.”  The term is not a doctrinal one des-
ignating a formal legal status.  Rather, it is a descriptive one capturing 
the hard-to-dispute reality that regardless of whether they are right or 
wrong, some cases are so firmly entrenched that the Court would not 
consider overruling them.34  Some super precedents establish founda-
tional institutional practices; others establish foundational doctrine.35  
 
 34 See Michael J. Gerhardt, Super Precedent, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1204, 1221 (2006) (“Super prec-
edent is a construct employed to signify the relatively rare times when it makes eminent 
sense to recognize that the correctness of a decision is a secondary (or far less important) 
consideration than its permanence.”);  see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Prece-
dent Viewed Through the Lens of Hartian Positivist Jurisprudence, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1107, 1116 
(2008) (“[T]he claim that there are super precedents immune from judicial overruling 
seems basically correct.”); Daniel A. Farber, The Rule of Law and the Law of Precedents, 90 
MINN. L. REV. 1173, 1180–82 (2006) (endorsing the proposition that some precedents are 
so entrenched that they cannot be overruled). 
 35 See Gerhardt, supra note 34, at 1207 (“The first kind of super precedent consists of 
longstanding Supreme Court decisions that establish what I call foundational institutional 
practices.  These decisions create and maintain particular modes of operation or particu-
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They have five characteristics: endurance over time, support by polit-
ical institutions, influence over constitutional doctrine, widespread 
social acquiescence, and widespread judicial agreement that they are 
no longer worth revisiting.36  The cases that appear most frequently 
on lists of super precedents include Marbury v. Madison,37 Martin v. 
Hunter’s Lessee,38 Helvering v. Davis,39 the Legal Tender Cases,40 Mapp v. 
Ohio,41 Brown v. Board of Education,42 and the Civil Rights Cases.43  Be-
cause their overruling is extraordinarily unlikely, decisions like these 
are invoked as evidence that stare decisis at least occasionally imposes 
a functionally absolute constraint upon the Court in constitutional 
cases. 
They are also invoked as evidence that originalism is unsustaina-
ble.44  At least some super precedents are thought to run contrary to 
the Constitution’s original meaning,45 and while that is disputed, we 
 
lar practices that become indispensable to the functioning of our government.  The prac-
tices established by these precedents have become so well entrenched within our society, 
have been so repeatedly endorsed and supported by public institutions, and have been 
the source of so many other lines of decisions, that they may be undone only through the 
most extremely radical, unprecedented acts of political and judicial will.”); id. at 1210 
(“Foundational doctrine refers to the support in case law for recognizing the existence 
and application of basic categories, kinds, or classes of constitutional disputes that endure 
over time.”). 
 36 Id. at 1213.  As noted below, congressional action may also establish constitutional super 
precedents.  See infra at notes 81–-86 and accompanying text. 
 37 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (holding constitutional the exercise of judicial review). 
 38 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) (holding constitutional the exercise of Supreme Court 
review of state court judgments). 
 39 301 U.S. 619 (1937) (holding constitutional the Social Security Act). 
 40 Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870) (holding constitutional the issuance of paper 
money). 
 41 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding the Fourth Amendment incorporated against the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 42 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the states from 
maintaining racially segregated public schools). 
 43 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to state action).  
Of course, there are other prominent decisions whose status as super precedents remains 
disputed.  Compare Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 219 F.3d 376, 376–77 
(4th Cir. 2000) (positing that the Supreme Court has given Roe v. Wade “super-stare deci-
sis” effect) with Gerhardt, supra note 38, at 1220 (observing that “the persistent condem-
nation of Roe . . . undermines its claim to entrenchment”).  And some super precedents 
derive from legislative actions, as we discuss below.  We are not concerned here with the 
precise content of the list of super precedents.  Rather, we assume that some super prec-
edents exist, and that they present unique challenges for any theory of constitutional in-
terpretation and for originalism in particular. 
 44 See, e.g., Gerhardt, supra note 34, at 1224 (arguing that strict adherence to originalism is 
inconsistent with stare decisis). 
 45 See, e.g., Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657, 668–69 (2009) (“A committed 
historicist could easily conclude that the Court’s privacy and women’s rights decisions are 
wrong, and that the use of paper money as legal tender, the use of the federal commerce 
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will assume for the sake of argument that it is true.  (Indeed, it would 
be extraordinary if it were not.  Originalists do not claim that the en-
tire corpus of constitutional precedents is characterized by unwaver-
ing fidelity to, much less flawless identification of, the Constitution’s 
original public meaning.)  Because originalists insist that the Consti-
tution’s text is the law, alterable only through the Article V amend-
ment process, the conventional account casts the originalist Justice as 
facing a dilemma: she must either abandon principle or adhere to it 
at great (and in some cases, catastrophic) cost.  As Michael Gerhardt 
puts it, “Originalists . . . have difficulty in developing a coherent, con-
sistently applied theory of adjudication that allows them to adhere to 
originalism without producing instability, chaos, and havoc in consti-
tutional law.”46 
Originalists have responded to this critique in a variety of ways.  
Some have bitten the bullet, maintaining that a Justice must remain 
true to the text regardless of the consequences.47  Others have tried to 
reconcile originalism and stare decisis, either by explaining why some 
important precedents thought to be at odds with the text are actually 
consistent with it48 or by offering a general theory about why original-
 
power to establish the welfare state and federal civil rights laws, and the federal adminis-
trative state itself are all unconstitutional.  Yet all of these doctrinal developments lie be-
yond any reasonable constitutional objection.”); Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and 
Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 728, 731, 739 (1988) (asserting that 
originalism cannot account for major features of our constitutional order, including 
Brown v. Board of Education, the New Deal expansion of federal power, and the increased 
role of the administrative state). 
 46 Gerhardt, supra note 34, at 1224.  This is not to say, of course, that other constitutional 
theories do not face similar challenges.  The concern is especially acute, however, with re-
spect to originalism. 
 47 See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, It’s a Bird, It’s a Plane, No, It’s Super Precedent: A Response to Farber 
and Gerhardt, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1232, 1233 (2006) (insisting that while “faint-hearted 
originalists” are willing to make a pragmatic exception to stare decisis to avoid political 
suicide, “[o]ther originalists . . . reject the doctrine of stare decisis in the following sense: 
if a prior decision of the Supreme Court is in conflict with the original meaning of the 
text of the Constitution, it is the Constitution and not precedent that binds present and 
future Justices.”) (footnotes and internal quotations omitted). 
 48 Several prominent originalists have tried to blunt the force of the stare decisis criticism by 
making an originalist case for supposedly nonoriginalist precedent.  See, e.g., Michael W. 
McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 949–53, 962–71 
(1995) (arguing that Brown v. Board of Education is consistent with the original meaning of 
the Fourteenth Amendment); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules 
for Its Own Interpretation? 103 NW. U. L. REV. 857, 901–-02, 905–07 (2009) (arguing that 
Brown, the Legal Tender Cases, cases rejecting state sex discrimination, and cases validating 
the administrative state are consistent with an originalist understanding of the Constitu-
tion); Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 TEX. L. 
REV. 1, 2–3 (2011) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s gender discrimination cases are, 
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ism can accommodate nonoriginalist precedent.49  Justice Scalia, for 
his part, lived with the contradiction, describing himself as a “faint-
hearted originalist” willing to adulterate principle with pragmatism.50 
A.  Judicial Agenda Control 
The challenge that nonoriginalist super precedent poses to 
originalism is real, but as one of us has argued elsewhere, stare decisis 
is the wrong lens through which to view it.51  The stare decisis critique 
posits an originalist justice confronted with the prospect of affirming 
or overruling a super precedent.  Yet the hypothetical is contrived, 
 
contrary to conventional wisdom, consistent with an originalist interpretation of the Four-
teenth Amendment). 
 49 See, e.g., Kurt T. Lash, Originalism, Popular Sovereignty, and Reverse Stare Decisis, 93 VA. L. 
REV. 1437, 1473–77 (2007) (maintaining that “a popular sovereignty-based originalist” 
can follow at least some erroneous precedents without sacrificing her normative com-
mitment to popular sovereignty); Jonathan F. Mitchell, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Text, 
110 MICH. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2011) (arguing that an originalist interpretation of the Consti-
tution can accommodate the doctrine of stare decisis).  The problem of stare decisis is 
conceptually easier for those who justify originalism on consequentialist grounds because 
following precedent rather than original meaning does not involve setting “the law” aside.  
The consequences of overruling deeply rooted precedent simply provide an exception to 
the general rule that the benefits of following the original public meaning outweigh the 
costs.  See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Originalism and Precedent, 
103 NW. U. L. REV. 803, 836–37 (2009) (arguing that an originalist should follow non-
originalist precedent rather than overrule it when, inter alia, the costs of overruling would 
be borderline catastrophic—as they would be with respect to paper money—or when the 
principles would be supported by constitutional amendment in the absence of the cas-
es—as they would be with respect to race and gender discrimination).  For those who ac-
cept the proposition that the original meaning constitutes the law, a particularly promis-
ing justification for choosing to follow precedent that conflicts with the original public 
meaning is that the Constitution itself authorizes courts to do so.  See Stephen E. Sachs, 
Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 817, 861–64 (2015) (as-
serting that if the doctrine of stare decisis “was part of the law at the Founding,” it might 
legitimately authorize or even require us to treat some unauthorized departures from 
precedent “as if the Court’s opinion correctly states the law”).  Whether the original Con-
stitution incorporates this strong form of stare decisis, however, is an as-yet-unexplored 
historical question. 
 50 Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 864 (1989).  Joel Alicea 
flags the problem that precedent can pose for a legislative originalist and posits that Con-
gress could follow Justice Scalia in making a pragmatic exception to originalism.  Alicea, 
An Originalist Congress?, supra note 22; see also Alicea, Questioning The Eminent Tribunal, 
NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE (Oct. 24, 2011), http://www.nationalreview.com/
node/281116 (opining that originalism carries “real political liabilities for a member of 
the political branches” but that “[a] great many of these liabilities can be alleviated  by 
‘adulterat[ing]’ one’s theory of originalism with a respect for precedent, as Justice Anto-
nin Scalia once put it . . . .”). 
 51 See Amy Coney Barrett, Precedent and Jurisprudential Disagreement, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1711, 
1730 (2013) (“[O]ther features of the federal judicial system, working together, do more 
than the constraint of horizontal stare decisis to keep the Court’s case law stable.”). 
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because no Supreme Court Justice will have to face the question 
whether paper money is constitutional or whether Brown v. Board of 
Education was rightly decided.  The question is never called, and it is 
worth paying careful attention to why.  It is not because of stare deci-
sis: when the question is not called, the force of stare decisis never 
kicks in.  These cases do not stay in place because Supreme Court Jus-
tices continually reaffirm them—sometimes, as the hypothetical goes, 
against a Justice’s first-order commitments.  These cases stay in place 
because the rules of adjudication keep the question of their validity 
off the table. 
A combination of constitutional, statutory, and judicially adopted 
rules would prevent a challenge to super precedent from coming be-
fore the Court.  As an initial matter, federal courts cannot answer 
questions in the abstract.  A justice lacks any obligation to systemati-
cally examine and volunteer an opinion about all aspects of the con-
stitutional landscape; indeed, Article III’s “case or controversy” re-
quirement prevents her from doing so.52  Constitutional adjudication 
is not like a confirmation hearing, in which answering hypothetical 
questions about the soundness of particular precedents is par for the 
course.  Judges can only address issues when litigants with standing 
bring them, and given that the overruling of a super precedent is, by 
definition, unthinkable, a litigant is unlikely to spend resources liti-
gating the point.  An outlier litigant who did so in a district court 
would lose on a motion to dismiss, and the court of appeals would 
summarily affirm.53 
Congress’s decision to make Supreme Court jurisdiction discre-
tionary, along with the Supreme Court’s rules about the cases it will 
take, would prevent the question from going farther than that.  The 
Court grants certiorari to decide an important, unsettled question of 
federal law; to resolve issues over which lower federal courts and/or 
state courts of last resort have split; or to deal with a lower court deci-
sion conflicting with Supreme Court precedent.54  This rule necessari-
 
 52 A cluster of doctrines enforce this requirement, including standing, mootness, ripeness, 
and the prohibition of advisory opinions. 
 53 The question whether an originalist judge in the lower courts would face a dilemma in-
volves questions of vertical stare decisis, which we put aside here.  Even if an originalist 
judge thinks that Supreme Court precedent conflicts with the original public meaning, 
her court’s position as “inferior” in the Article III hierarchy may well oblige her to follow 
it anyway.  See generally Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Prec-
edents, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817 (1994) (offering rationales for a lower court’s obligation to 
follow the precedent of a superior court).  Because the situation of the lower-court judge 
involves a distinct set of constitutional questions, we do not explore it here. 
 54 See SUP. CT. R. 10(a)-(c) (identifying these grounds for granting certiorari). 
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ly keeps so-called super precedents off the Court’s merits docket, for 
super precedents are defined as opinions that have won nearly uni-
versal acceptance.  There is not likely to be a single decision below, 
much less a conflict, addressing the question whether the Gold 
Clauses permit the issuance of paper money or whether the Four-
teenth Amendment prohibits the states from maintaining racially 
segregated schools.  The conditions for bringing a head-on challenge 
to super precedent before the Court thus do not exist. 
To be sure, some super precedents lie in the background of cases 
that do come before the Court.  The validity of Marbury v. Madison 
will not be the question presented, but its holding underlies every ex-
ercise of judicial review.55  The incorporation of the exclusionary rule 
against the states is settled, but a case reviewing whether a particular 
state action violated the Fourth Amendment builds on the founda-
tion of Mapp v. Ohio.56  One might wonder whether the Court is obli-
gated to consider the validity of such background precedents in the 
course of rendering a decision.57 
Once again, institutional features of Supreme Court decision-
making permit the Justices to keep the soundness of such precedents 
off their agenda.  The Supreme Court has adopted rules, some pur-
suant to its inherent authority under Article III and some pursuant to 
a congressional grant of rulemaking authority, to structure its af-
fairs.58  Many of these rules are mechanisms for narrowing the ques-
tions the Court will address in the cases before it.  The Court deliber-
ately restrains itself from identifying and opining upon every possible 
error presented by a case before it.  For example, the Court deems 
waived—and thus will not address—issues not raised in the courts be-
low.59  Supreme Court Rule 14.1, moreover, provides that the Court 
 
 55 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 56 367 U.S. 643, 673–74 (1961). 
 57 To be sure, the Court may attempt to narrow longstanding precedent even if it refrains 
from considering whether to overrule it.  See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 
567 (1995) (noting that prior cases “suggested the possibility of additional expansion [of 
the commerce power]” but “declin[ing] here to proceed any further”). 
 58 See 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (granting the Supreme Court the authority to “prescribe rules for the 
conduct of [its] business”).  On inherent authority, see Amy Coney Barrett, Procedural 
Common Law, 94 VA. L. REV. 813, 842–79 (2008) (arguing that Article III’s grant of “the 
judicial power” endows federal courts with the authority to adopt procedural rules). 
 59 See, e.g., Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 56 n.4 (2002) (finding a waiver of the 
argument that federal maritime governed a boating accident case “[b]ecause this argu-
ment was not raised below”).  The “harmless error” rule also contradicts the picture of a 
Court obligated to right every wrong.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (instructing appellate courts, 
including the Supreme Court, to “give judgment after an examination of the record 
without regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the par-
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will decide only those questions presented in the petition for certio-
rari.60  It is thus contrary to the Court’s longstanding practice for it to 
decide whether to overrule precedent if a petitioner did not ask—
and four justices did not agree to answer—that question.61  Granted, 
this prohibition is not absolute, and the Court has occasionally or-
dered briefing on an issue that the litigants did not raise.62  This prac-
tice is controversial, however, and any such order requires having Jus-
tices who want to reach the issue.63  The premise of the super 
precedent challenge to originalism is that originalism compels Justic-
es to disturb precedents they want to leave alone. 
We do not contend that the Court consciously applies these rules 
to avoid having to decide whether well-settled precedent is errone-
ous—although it sometimes might.  We contend only that a salutary 
effect of the standard rules allocating judicial resources is to keep the 
validity of these precedents off the Court’s agenda.  Insofar as we 
characterize these effects as salutary, our argument has something in 
common with the “passive virtues” that Alexander Bickel extolled.64  
 
ties”).  The centuries-old avoidance doctrine is similarly at odds with a vision of a Su-
preme Court on a mission to clear up all constitutional confusion. 
 60 See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 919–20 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (as-
serting that the Court had not considered whether to overrule precedent in other corpo-
rate speech cases because “[n]ot a single party in any of those cases asked [it] to” and 
“the Court generally does not consider constitutional arguments that have not properly 
been raised”) (citation omitted); SUP. CT. R. 14.1(a) (“Only the questions set out in the 
petition, or fairly included therein, will be considered by the Court.”). 
 61 The Court will grant a petition for certiorari if four justices favor doing so.  See Joan 
Maisel Leiman, The Rule of Four, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 975, 981 (1957) (discussing the ori-
gins of the “rule of four”). 
 62 See, e.g., United States v. Texas, No. 15-674, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 841 (U.S. Jan. 19, 2016) 
(granting certiorari and directing the parties to address the additional question of 
whether federal immigration law guidance violates the Take Care Clause); Citizens Unit-
ed v. FEC, 129 S. Ct. 2893, 2893 (2009) (requesting supplemental briefing on whether the 
Court should overrule two of its prior precedents); Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 
792, 797 (2009) (overruling Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986), after calling for 
supplemental briefing on the question whether it should be overruled); Payne v. Tennes-
see, 498 U.S. 1076 (1991) (ordering supplemental briefing on the question whether two 
controlling precedents should be overruled). 
 63 See, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 396 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (asserting that ordering 
the parties to address whether precedent should be overruled is “unusual and inadvisable 
for a court”).  See generally Henry Paul Monaghan, On Avoiding Avoidance, Agenda Control, 
and Related Matters, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 665 (2012) (describing the controversial nature 
of the practice).  The number of Justices required to order briefing or argument on a 
question not raised by the parties appears to be a matter of internal practice, for it is not 
addressed by the Supreme Court Rules.  Given that the practice is controversial, it is un-
likely that it could be done without the support of a majority. 
 64 See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT 
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962) (commending the techniques that the Court employs to 
avoid unnecessarily deciding constitutional questions); Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme 
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Bickel argued that doctrines like standing, mootness, and ripeness 
left a “wide area of choice open to the Court in deciding whether, 
when, and how much to adjudicate.”65  He credited Justice Louis 
Brandeis for believing that “the mediating techniques of ‘not doing’ 
were ‘the most important thing we do.’”66  That “not doing” helps the 
Court navigate the proper course between constitutional principle 
and pragmatic decision making.  So conceived, the passive virtues are 
about timing.  They posit a distinction between deciding what the 
Constitution means and deciding when to decide what the Constitu-
tion means. 
None of this is to say that a Justice cannot attempt to overturn 
long-established precedent.  While institutional features may hinder 
that effort (for example, the fact that it takes four to grant certiorari 
and five to command a majority on the merits), a Justice is free to 
try.67  The point is simply that a commitment to originalism does not 
force a Justice to do so. 
Institutional features of Supreme Court practice permit all Justices 
to let some sleeping dogs lie, and so far as we are aware, no one has 
ever argued that a Justice is duty-bound to wake them up.  Such a 
claim would be extraordinary, for the Court’s agenda-limiting rules 
are well within its authority to adopt.  The formal rules—i.e., the ones 
published as “Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States”—
plainly fall within the Enabling Act’s grant of authority to the Court 
to “prescribe rules for the conduct of [its] business.”68  A major point 
of procedural rules in both the Supreme Court and the lower federal 
 
Court 1960 Term—Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961).  For a compre-
hensive summary of Bickel’s work, see generally Anthony T. Kronman, Alexander Bickel’s 
Philosophy of Prudence, 94 YALE L.J. 1567 (1985). 
 65 BICKEL, supra note 64, at 79. 
 66 Id. at 112 (quoting Melvin I. Urofsky, The Brandeis-Frankfurter Conversations, 1985 SUP. CT. 
REV. 299, 313 (1986)). 
 67 Justice Thomas, for example, has expressed willingness to revisit the “substantial effects” 
test that the Court applies to the Commerce Clause, but he has been a lone voice.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Until 
this Court replaces its existing Commerce Clause jurisprudence with a standard more 
consistent with the original understanding, we will continue to see Congress appropriat-
ing state police powers under the guise of regulating commerce.”); United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“In an appropriate case, I be-
lieve that we must further reconsider our ‘substantial effects’ test with an eye toward con-
structing a standard that reflects the text and history of the Commerce Clause without to-
tally rejecting our more recent Commerce Clause jurisprudence.”). 
 68 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (2012).  Unlike other federal courts, whose local rules are subject to, 
inter alia, notice-and-comment requirements, this statute leaves the Supreme Court in 
complete control of its rulemaking process.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2071(b) (exempting the Su-
preme Court from notice-and-comment requirement). 
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courts is the efficient allocation of judicial resources, which often in-
volves narrowing the legal issues that a court will address.  Thus, for 
example, a district court deems certain defenses waived if not proper-
ly raised,69 a court of appeals refuses to consider meritorious argu-
ments in an untimely brief,70 and the Supreme Court decides only 
those questions presented in a petition for certiorari.71  Even the im-
position of page limits on briefs operates to reduce the number of is-
sues before a court.  It would be quite something, and contrary to 
centuries of history, to maintain that such standard procedural rules 
are unconstitutional because their application may preclude consid-
eration of a potential constitutional error. 
The same is true for procedures that the Court develops in com-
mon-law fashion.72  The Court’s ability to develop procedural com-
mon law yields familiar doctrines like claim and issue preclusion, 
both of which promote efficiency by treating some matters (including 
claims of constitutional error) as closed.73  In addition, Article III’s 
grant of “the judicial Power” carries with it the inherent authority to 
adopt rules governing adjudication.74  This authority empowers the 
Court to make myriad other, less visible decisions like how certiorari 
petitions make a “discuss” list,75 how many votes are necessary for a 
grant of certiorari,76 and whether to resolve a case on a constitutional 
or nonconstitutional ground.77  The Court could not function without 
 
 69 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b), (h) (providing that certain defenses are waived if not raised 
in a particular manner). 
 70 See, e.g., FED. R. APP. P. 25 (providing that a brief is timely only when the clerk receives the 
papers within the time fixed for filing). 
 71 See, e.g., SUP. CT. R. 14 (“Only the questions set out in the petition, or fairly included 
therein, will be considered by the Court.”).  Other examples appear throughout the 
rules. 
 72 See Barrett, supra note 58, at 879–88 (explaining the sources of the federal courts’ power 
to develop procedural common law). 
 73 Id. at 829–32 (identifying preclusion as a paradigmatic example of procedural common 
law).  Stare decisis itself is a judicially created doctrine.  See id. at 823–29, 879, 885 (ex-
plaining the nature of stare decisis). 
 74 See id. at 842 (“A long and well-established tradition maintains that some powers are in-
herent in federal courts simply because Article III denominates them ‘courts’ in posses-
sion of ‘the judicial power.’”). 
 75 See Kathryn A. Watts, Constraining Certiorari Using Administrative Law Principles, 160 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1, 14–18 (2011) (describing the Court’s certiorari practice). 
 76 The rule that it takes four votes to grant certiorari is an internal practice of the Court ra-
ther than a formal rule.  See Rogers v. Mo. Pac. R. Co., 352 U.S. 521, 529 (1957) (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting) (describing the “Rule of Four” as a “working rule devised by the 
Court as a practical mode of determining that a case is deserving of review”). 
 77 See, e.g., Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 197 (2009) (reiter-
ating that the Court’s “usual practice is to avoid the unnecessary resolution of constitu-
tional questions”).  Canons like the avoidance doctrine are also exercises of inherent au-
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some ability to set ground rules to channel its decision-making pro-
cess.  Again, it would be quite something, and contrary to centuries of 
history, to insist that a duty to ferret out and rectify constitutional er-
ror overrides the doctrines and internal practices that otherwise regu-
late the Court’s decision-making process. 
In sum, the rules of adjudication—constitutional, jurisdictional, 
and procedural—promote efficiency and stability in constitutional 
law by narrowing the Court’s agenda.  Unless originalism or any oth-
er constitutional theory requires a Justice to undertake the task of 
rooting out all errors from the United States Reports, super prece-
dent need never put any Justice, originalist or not, in a dilemma.  If a 
nonoriginalist precedent is truly part of the constitutional fabric, the 
Court will not be asked to reconsider it, nor does a commitment to 
originalism require that any Justice volunteer to do so. 
Focusing on the source of super precedent’s force reveals a point 
that is entirely overlooked in the stare decisis debate: the rules of ad-
judication contemplate the presence of mistaken constitutional in-
terpretations that the Court has no obligation to correct.  They pro-
mote stability by instructing the Court at almost every stage of the 
process not to pick a fight.  The prohibition on advisory opinions 
prevents federal courts from roving around on a hunt for errors, in-
cluding errors in judicial precedents.  The Court’s internal rules gov-
erning certiorari prevent it from revisiting precedent unless pressure 
builds from below.  Keeping to the question presented prevents jus-
tices from reaching out to correct mistakes not squarely before them.  
Combined, these rules and others like them do as much or more 
than stare decisis doctrine to promote stability in constitutional law 
by keeping some questions off the table.  There is much precedent 
that the Court simply never squarely confronts and is therefore never 
forced to either sanction or condemn. 
Despite its usual framing as part of the stare decisis debate, the 
challenge that super precedent poses for originalism is not really one 
of stare decisis.  Stare decisis is a self-imposed constraint on the 
Court’s ability to overrule its prior cases.  Its constraint operates (or 
yields) when the Court is asked to overturn a precedent.  In the con-
text of super precedent, however, that question is never asked.  If it 
were, the precedent would no longer be “super,” because the condi-
tion necessary for super precedent status—that its overruling be un-
 
thority.  See Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. REV. 109, 
163, 163 n.260 (2010) (noting that inherent authority is the basis for many of the can-
ons). 
Oct. 2016] CONGRESSIONAL ORIGINALISM 23 
 
thinkable—would no longer hold true.  Stare decisis is not what holds 
a super precedent in place, for the force of a super precedent does 
not derive from the Court’s refusal to overrule it.  Rather, it stays in 
place largely because it stays off the Court’s agenda. 
III.  SUPER PRECEDENT IN CONGRESS 
Super precedent may pose little challenge for an originalist Su-
preme Court Justice, but does the same hold true for an originalist 
senator or representative?  Members of Congress, after all, are among 
the public officials whose thorough embrace of super precedents 
keeps them off the Supreme Court’s agenda.  In that respect, they 
might bear more responsibility than the Court for perpetuating un-
constitutional interpretations.  A Supreme Court Justice will not have 
to decide whether the Social Security Administration is unconstitu-
tional.  A senator, however, will have to decide whether to fund it and 
whether to confirm the President’s nominees to head it. 
One way to frame the issue is to ask which branch, if any, has an 
affirmative duty to identify and rectify deep-seated constitutional er-
ror.  Part II explained that the rules of adjudication, from the prohi-
bition on advisory opinions to the Court’s internal procedures, create 
structural barriers to the Court’s ability to correct constitutional er-
rors, which makes it hard to argue that a Justice has a constitutional 
duty to do so.  The Justice answers the questions she is asked.  A 
member of Congress, however, is differently situated.  Institutional 
differences abound, but for present purposes, one is particularly sali-
ent. 
The Court is a reactive body, limited to answering only those ques-
tions that come to it, and the rules of adjudication narrow those ques-
tions with near laser-like focus.  There is no similarly stylized agenda-
narrowing mechanism in the legislature.  The constitutional question 
presented to Congress before it acts is more nebulous and arguably 
much broader than that presented to the Court.  In adjudicating a 
First Amendment challenge to a counterfeiting statute,78 for example, 
the Court is not asked—and is thus constrained from answering—the 
question whether the United States’ issuance of paper money is con-
stitutional in the first place.  In Congress, by contrast, the question is 
not so neatly confined.  The oath requires each member of Congress 
to ensure that a proposed measure is constitutional.  Does that mean 
 
 78 See Regan v. Time, 468 U.S. 641, 650, 653, 658 (1984) (holding a statute prohibiting the 
publication of illustrations of United States currency to be valid in part and invalid in part 
under the First Amendment). 
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that the member must evaluate every possible constitutional issue?  
When a member evaluates a bill appropriating money to the Bureau 
of Engraving and Printing, whose mission is “to develop and produce 
United States currency notes,”79 must she analyze whether the issu-
ance of paper money is constitutional?  If not, why not? 
Judicial supremacy is not the answer.  As an initial matter, many 
originalists reject judicial supremacy in favor of departmentalism.80  
In other words, they reject the proposition that the reasoning of Su-
preme Court opinions binds the other branches in favor of the view 
that each branch must interpret the Constitution for itself.81  For a 
departmentalist, it is insufficient to say that because the Supreme 
Court decided a case, Congress has no choice but to follow it.  And if 
departmentalists are right that members of Congress have the free-
dom and even the obligation to challenge precedents that they do 
not like, the burden rests on them to explain why the duty does not 
exist with respect to precedents that members of Congress would pre-
fer to leave alone. 
In addition, however, one cannot invoke judicial supremacy to re-
solve a conflict between text and precedent when the precedent is 
nonjudicial.  The canon of super precedent is comprised of cases be-
cause constitutional scholars focus on the Supreme Court.  But Con-
gress and the President have also created super precedents, including 
the constitutionality of the Louisiana Purchase,82 the admission of the 
state of West Virginia,83 the seating of territorial delegates in the 
House,84 the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment,85 the crea-
 
 79 U.S. DEPT. OF ENGRAVING AND PRINTING, ABOUT THE BEP (2015), 
http://www.moneyfactory.gov/about.html. 
 80 See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the 
Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 221 (1994) (“The President’s power to interpret the law is, with-
in the sphere of his powers, precisely coordinate and coequal in authority to the Supreme 
Court’s.”); Saikrishna Prakash & John Yoo, Against Interpretive Supremacy, 103 MICH. L. 
REV. 1539, 1554–55 (2005) (arguing that the other branches must enforce court judg-
ments in individual cases but that “[t]hey have no obligation to adopt and implement the 
constitutional interpretations that form the basis of those judgments”). 
 81 See Walter F. Murphy, Who Shall Interpret?  The Quest for the Ultimate Constitutional Interpreter, 
48 REV. POL. 401, 406–07 (1986) (defining judicial supremacy as “the obligation of coor-
dinate officials not only to obey that ruling but to follow its reasoning in future delibera-
tions”). 
 82 See generally Samuel Issacharoff, Meriwether Lewis, The Air Force, and the Surge: The Problem of 
Constitutional Settlement, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 649 (2008). 
 83 See Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 3, at 313–25 (recounting the “remarkably substantive 
debate” in Congress “over the constitutional issues surrounding West Virginia’s admission 
into the Union as a State”). 
 84 See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789–
1801 200–03 (1997) (discussing the seating of a delegate from the Southwest Territory “in 
accordance with the tradition created by the Northwest Ordinance and the ‘compact’ 
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tion of the Smithsonian Institution,86 and the establishment of the 
United States Air Force.87  As in our discussion of judicial super prec-
edents, we will assume for the sake of argument that some of these 
political super precedents are inconsistent with the Constitution’s 
original public meaning.  Not having examined the question whether 
any of these super precedents is consistent with the original public 
meaning, we don’t rule out the possibility that they all are.  But it 
strikes us as highly unlikely that an originalist could successfully show 
that every single significant precedent is indeed consistent with an 
originalist interpretation of the text.  And if deeply rooted political 
precedent is at odds with the text, it poses as great a challenge to the 
originalist legislator as precedent of the judicial variety. 
In this Part, we argue that while Congress is very different from 
the Court, it too can employ techniques that narrow the questions it 
addresses.  In particular, it can avoid the need to examine the sound-
ness of super precedent by adopting a presumption that such prece-
dent is constitutional.  This presumption need not, as is commonly 
assumed, reflect a legislative decision to treat super precedent as con-
trolling law that trumps any contrary constitutional text.  Rather, it 
can serve as a reason for Congress not to weigh in at all on the ques-
tion whether the precedent conflicts with the text.  Adopting a pre-
sumption that it will not revisit the correctness of long-settled prece-
dent is both sensible and consistent with what Congress already does. 
Most arguments that an office holder must choose text rather 
than precedent have focused on the role of the office holder’s oath 
 
made when the territory was established”); Everett S. Brown, The Territorial Delegate to Con-
gress, in THE TERRITORIAL DELEGATE TO CONGRESS AND OTHER ESSAYS 5 (1950) (describ-
ing the practice of choosing delegates as an early precedent created by the House); Mi-
chael Stern, The First House Debate on Admitting Delegates, POINT OF ORDER: A DISCUSSION 
OF CONGRESSIONAL LEGAL ISSUES (Jan. 21, 2015, 3:00 PM) (discussing the congressional 
debate regarding the seating of territorial delegates in Congress). 
 85 See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 4295–96 (1868) (concurrent resolution delaring 
that the Fourteenth Amendment “is hereby determined to be part of the Constitution of 
the United States” approved by the House by a vote of 127-33, with fifty-five members not 
voting); see also S. RES. 198, 114TH CONG., 1ST SESS. (2015) (commemorating the 150th 
anniversary of the ratification of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments 
in an unanimous resolution and stating that “the people of the United States . . . ratified 
the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States on July 9, 1868”). 
 86 See Springer v. Gov’t of Phil. Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 211 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting) 
(stating that “Congress long ago established the Smithsonian Institution, to question 
which would be to lay hands on the Ark of the Covenant”); CURRIE, supra note 28, at 136–
41 (discussing the creation of the Smithsonian Institute, an organization financed by 
money gifted to the United States and run by federal officers but whose functions were 
governmental rather than proprietary in nature). 
 87 See Issacharoff, supra note 82, at 660–62 (addressing the reconciliation between the text of 
the Constitution and existence of the Air Force). 
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to support the Constitution, so we begin there.  After explaining the 
general requirements of the oath and its implications for the prob-
lem of precedent, we advance our argument that the presumption of 
constitutionality offers the conscientious legislator a way to avoid 
choosing between the text and a settled interpretation.  By control-
ling its agenda, Congress, like the Court, may control the timing of its 
constitutional deliberations, especially when confronted with a super 
precedent. 
A.  The Oath 
The Constitution provides that members of Congress “shall be 
bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution.”88  The 
current form of that oath, which is prescribed by statute, commits 
each member of Congress to “support and defend the Constitution of 
the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic” and to 
“bear true faith and allegiance to the same.”89  The oath-based argu-
ment against reliance on precedents assumes that “supporting” the 
Constitution requires a member of Congress to follow the Constitu-
tion itself, rather than a presumptively erroneous interpretation of it. 
While the oath to “support . . . the Constitution” implicates mat-
ters other than constitutional interpretation,90 it is widely understood 
 
 88 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. 
 89 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (2016). 
 90 To start, the oath underscores the seriousness of the responsibilities of a Member of Con-
gress.  See JOSEPH STORY, A FAMILIAR EXPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES 252 (1847) (“[T]hose, who are intrusted with the execution of the powers of the 
National Government, should be bound, by some solemn obligation, to the due execu-
tion of the trusts reposed in them . . . . Oaths have a solemn obligation upon the minds of 
all reflecting men, and especially upon those, who feel a deep sense of accountability to a 
Supreme being.”); Patrick O. Gudridge, The Office of the Oath, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 387, 
402 (2003) (concluding that the point of the oath is “to show the sincerity of the invoca-
tion of the Constitution”); Vic Snyder, You’ve Taken An Oath To Support The Constitution, 
Now What?  The Constitutional Requirement For a Congressional Oath Of Office, 23 U. ARK. 
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 897, 919 (2001) (citing officials who described the “sacred obliga-
tion” imposed by the oath).  Members of Congress have cited the oath as establishing a 
duty to defend the prerogatives of Congress against encroachment by the executive and 
the judiciary.  See Lee Hamilton, What It Means When You Take That Oath, THE CENTER ON 
CONGRESS AT INDIANA UNIVERSITY (Apr. 21, 2006), http://centeroncongress.org/what-it-
means-when-you-take-oath-office (“When you take the oath of office as a member of Con-
gress, it means that you are swearing to defend the Congress as a strong, independent, 
and co-equal branch of government.”); U.S. Senator Robert C. Byrd, Remarks by U.S. 
Senator Robert C. Byrd at the Orientation of New Senators (Dec. 3, 1996), reprinted in 156 
CONG. REC. S5471 (daily ed. June 28, 2010) (“In order to live up to that solemn oath, one 
must clearly understand the deliberately established inherent tensions between the 3 
branches, commonly called the checks and balances, and separation of powers which the 
framers so carefully crafted.”).  “Defend,” the other requirement, featured in debates 
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to also require legislators to observe the constitutional limits upon 
congressional action.  As Paul Brest observed in his classic article, 
“the most obvious way for a legislator to support the Constitution is to 
enact only legislation that is constitutional.”91  Put differently, a legis-
lator must refrain from supporting legislation that is unconstitution-
al.92  Judges have cited the oath as a reason for presuming that legisla-
tors have enacted legislation that is consistent with the Constitution.93  
Recently, the House itself relied on the oath when instituting the re-
quirement that each proposed bill contain a statement identifying its 
constitutional authority.  “While the courts have the power to over-
 
concerning the fate of Confederate officials.  Both “support” and “defend” have been at 
issue in subsequent controversies involving allegedly subversive officials.  See Bond v. 
Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 136 (1966) (holding that a state legislature could not refuse to seat 
an elected official who opposed the Vietnam War); Snyder, supra, at 912 (recounting that 
the House twice refused to seat a Socialist elected by Wisconsin voters because he was too 
disloyal to take the oath of office). 
 91 Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator’s Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 STAN. L. 
REV. 585, 587 (1975); see also Paulsen, supra note 80, at 260 (“Can one ‘support’ the Con-
stitution and simultaneously abet what one considers to be a violation of any of its provi-
sions?”).  For affirmations of this duty from legislators themselves, see, e.g., 159 CONG. 
REC. S6771 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 2013) (statement of Sen. Lee) (“We, as Senators of the 
United States, having taken an oath under article VI of the Constitution to uphold the 
Constitution of the United States, are never excused from our responsibility to look out 
for, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States.”); 81 CONG. REC. app. 
378–79 (1937) (extension of remarks of Sen. Alva B. Adams, reprinting radio address of 
Sen. Royal S. Copeland) (arguing that “since all members of Congress likewise take an 
oath to support the Constitution, they must, when a proposed law is before them, decide 
whether they have the constitutional power to pass the legislation”). 
 92 William Baude maintains that the President can sign a new law that he knows, or believes, 
is unconstitutional without violating his oath to support and defend the Constitution.  See 
William Baude, Signing Unconstitutional Laws, 86 IND. L.J. 303, 304–05 (2011).  Baude ar-
gues that “[t]here is simply no constitutional provision, and no plausible interpretation of 
the President’s oath, that flatly forbids signing unconstitutional bills into law.”  Id. at 304–
05.  His argument is not limited to the situation in which the constitutional flaw inheres 
in precedent conflicting with the text; it is a broader one about the President’s duty to 
uphold the Constitution.  Baude contrasts the constitutional harm resulting from signing 
a law containing an unconstitutional provision with “the President’s broad duty to en-
force the Constitution,” which “frequently requires him to help pass legislation—especially 
in the national-security and individual-rights contexts.”  Id. at 305.  Faced with a bill that 
both violates and enforces the Constitution, Baude suggests that the President enjoys the 
discretion to determine the proper course.  We are not so sure.  But because different 
considerations shape the President’s duty—for example, his oath is differently worded 
and his role in the legislative process is different—we do not address Baude’s argument 
in our discussion of the implications of the oath for a Member of Congress. 
 93 See Nat’l Endowment for Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 605 n.3 (1998) (Souter, J., dissent-
ing) (“[m]embers of Congress must take an oath or affirmation to support the Constitu-
tion . . . and we should presume in every case that Congress believed its statute to be con-
sistent with the constitutional commands.”); Edward v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 610–11 
(1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that each of the state legislators who had passed a 
law “had sworn to support the Constitution”). 
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turn an Act of Congress on the basis that it is unconstitutional,” the 
House leaders explained, “Members of Congress have a responsibil-
ity, as clearly indicated by the oath of office each Member takes, to 
adhere to the Constitution.”94 
We do not mean to imply that the oath is the exclusive source of 
Congress’s duty to observe the limits of the Constitution.  Indeed, we 
think the conventional arguments about Congress’s duty of fidelity to 
the Constitution risk overstating the role of the oath.  Even apart 
from the oath, the Constitution’s structure reflects an expectation 
that Congress will interpret and adhere to its limits.  For example, it 
would be odd for the Constitution to prescribe detailed rules about 
how Congress must conduct its affairs (including detailed rules about 
bicameralism, presentment, and overriding a presidential veto) and 
simultaneously think Congress free to disregard them.  The Constitu-
tion expresses a baseline devotion to a government bound by law and 
is thus itself a source of the obligation for the government to follow 
the law.  Moreover, while the oath constrains individuals, the more 
general demands of the Constitution constrain Congress as an institu-
tion.  Undue focus on the oath obscures these points. 
For present purposes, however, these distinctions are unim-
portant.  The oath is convenient shorthand for the obligation of fidel-
ity, even if that obligation is reinforced by other sources.  And regard-
less whether our protagonist is an originalist Congress or an 
originalist member of Congress, the dilemma posed by nonoriginalist 
super precedent is the same. 
B.  Precedent and the Oath 
The connection between precedent and the oath has been given 
close attention in the literature on judicial supremacy.  While the 
Court itself has insisted that its interpretations of the Constitution 
constitute the supreme law of the land, both the President and Con-
gress have periodically asserted the authority to contradict the opin-
ions of the Supreme Court.95  Most scholars have rejected the Su-
preme Court’s view of its own supremacy in favor of the proposition 
that the other departments of the federal government enjoy some in-
 
 94 Hanah Metchis Volokh, Constitutional Authority Statements in Congress, 65 FLA. L. REV. 173, 
184 (2013). 
 95 See, e.g., Amy Coney Barrett, Introduction, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1147, 1158–59 (2008) 
(providing examples of occasions on which the President and Congress have asserted the 
authority to contradict the opinions of the Supreme Court). 
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terpretive autonomy.96  Invoking the oath, some supporters of this in-
terpretive autonomy emphasize that Congress and the President have 
not only the freedom but also the obligation to interpret the Consti-
tution for themselves. 
Consider what Andrew Jackson had to say in his oft-quoted mes-
sage vetoing the bill that would have renewed the Second Bank of the 
United States: 
The Congress, the Executive, and the Court must each for itself be guid-
ed by its own opinion of the Constitution.  Each public officer who takes 
an oath to support the Constitution swears that he will support it as he 
understands it, and not as it is understood by others.  It as much the duty 
of the House of Representatives, of the Senate, and of the President to 
decide upon the constitutionality of any bill or resolution which may be 
presented to them for passage or approval as it is of the supreme judges 
when it may be brought before them for judicial decision.97 
Jackson refused to concede the constitutionality of the Bank de-
spite the Supreme Court’s holding in McCulloch v. Maryland that 
Congress had the authority to establish it.98  His argument, echoed by 
others, is not that the other departments simply have the power to re-
ject Supreme Court interpretations with which they disagree.  It is 
that they have a duty to interpret the Constitution for themselves. 
Originalists are among the most ardent supporters of a strongly 
departmentalist view, but they have not focused on the dilemma it 
poses for an originalist President or member of Congress who thinks 
a Supreme Court interpretation is wrong but does not want to depart 
from it.  Departmentalists, including originalists, are entirely occu-
pied with situations in which the President or Congress is eager to 
express its disagreement with the Court because the decision conflicts 
with a policy preference—like Jackson and the Bank.  But the strong 
view of departmentalism, with its emphasis on the duty of interpretive 
 
 96 Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer are notable exceptions.  See generally Larry Alex-
ander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 
1359 (1997) (arguing for judicial supremacy).  But theirs is a minority view.  See Edward 
A. Hartnett, A Matter of Judgment, Not a Matter of Opinion, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 123, 126 (1999) 
(gathering a list of all of the scholars who find Alexander and Schauer “eloquen[t]” but 
unconvincing).  Among those who reject a strong form of judicial supremacy, there is a 
range of views about the amount of interpretive independence that the political branches 
enjoy.  Compare Paulsen, supra note 80 (maintaining that the President must refuse to ex-
ecute even judgments he deems unconstitutional) with Hartnett, supra (rejecting the view 
that Supreme Court opinions bind the other branches but maintaining that the political 
branches nonetheless owe them deference). 
 97 Andrew Jackson, Veto Message (July 10, 1832) in 2 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND 
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1139 (James D. Richardson, III ed., 2d ed. 1911) [hereinafter 
Jackson’s Veto Message]. 
 98 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
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autonomy, poses a problem for an originalist that is particularly pro-
nounced when the judicial interpretation is a super precedent.  A 
President or member of Congress subscribing to a pragmatic consti-
tutional approach could assert the duty of independent evaluation 
but could also, like the pragmatic Justice, conclude that the best 
course is to defer to longstanding precedent with which she disa-
grees.99  An originalist, however, is constrained to treat the original 
public meaning as controlling; precedent cannot alter or supersede 
it.100  If the oath forbids a member of Congress to vote in favor of a 
bill that the member believes to be unconstitutional, an originalist 
legislator may well be duty-bound to refuse to support, say, the fund-
ing of the Bureau of Engraving and Printing on the ground that The 
Legal Tender cases were wrongly decided. 
Precedent established by the political branches does not implicate 
judicial supremacy, but it presents a variation of the same problem.101  
Consider another discussion of the relationship between precedent 
and the oath, this one also involving the Bank of the United States.  
While Representative James Madison argued in 1791 that the Bank 
was unconstitutional, President James Madison signed a bill creating 
the Second Bank of the United States in 1816.102  Reflecting later on 
his decision and criticizing Jackson’s, Madison insisted that it is con-
sistent with the oath for an office holder to act in accordance with 
settled precedent rather than with the office holder’s own under-
standing of the Constitution.  (The precedent on which Madison 
himself relied in 1816 was political, for McCulloch v. Maryland was not 
decided until 1819.103)  Madison wrote Pennsylvania Representative 
Charles Ingersoll: 
 
 99 That is one reading of Jackson’s concession in his veto message that precedent should not 
control “except where the acquiescence of the people and the States can be considered as 
well settled.”  Jackson’s Veto Message, supra note 97, at 1145. 
100 To be sure, an originalist could treat precedent rather than text as controlling if the Con-
stitution itself permits precedent, in at least some circumstances, to be treated “as if” it 
were the law.  See Sachs, supra note 49, at 860–64 (raising, but not answering, the question 
whether such an approach to stare decisis “has its own good title to being part of our 
law—whether it was part of the law at the Founding or has been lawfully added since”). 
101 They are not, of course, exactly the same.  Dealing with judicial precedent implicates the 
separation of powers and inter-branch comity; dealing with Congress’s own precedent 
does not. 
102  See Richard S. Arnold, How James Madison Interpreted the Constitution, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267, 
286 (1997) (explaining Madison’s changing position regarding the Bank). 
103 See McCulloch, 17 U.S. 316 (holding that Congress had the authority under the Necessary 
and Proper Clause to establish the Bank); Letter from James Madison to Charles Jared 
Ingersoll (June 25, 1831) reprinted in THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE 
POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON 391 (Marvin Meyers ed., revised ed. 1981) [here-
inafter Madison Letter to C.J. Ingersoll] (“The charge of [my] inconsistency . . . turns on 
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But it be said that the legislator, having sworn to support the constitu-
tion, must support it in his own construction of it, however different from 
that put on it by his predecessors, or whatever be the consequences of 
the construction. . . . Yet has it ever been supposed that he was required, 
or at liberty to disregard all precedents, however solemnly repeated and 
regularly observed, to disturb the established course of practice in the 
business of the community? 104 
Madison thus rejected the idea that the oath required him to ad-
here to his own best reading of the text.  Indeed, he suggested that 
duty cuts in the opposite direction.  Absolute fidelity to one’s own in-
terpretive theory would, he maintained, be impossible in any event.  
He went on to tell Ingersoll that “[the most ardent theorist] will find 
it impossible to adhere, and act officially upon, his solitary opinions 
as to the meaning of the law or Constitution, in opposition to a con-
struction reduced to practice during a reasonable period of time.”105 
Thus Jackson claimed that the oath bound him to follow his own 
best understanding rather than precedent, and Madison insisted that 
the oath permitted him to choose precedent rather than what he 
thought was the right interpretation.  Some originalists applaud Jack-
son’s view and express skepticism, to say the least, about Madison’s.106  
It is easy to see why.  Broad-brush arguments about the oath, com-
bined with emphasis on the preeminence of the text’s original mean-
ing, yield the following position: If the text’s original meaning is the 
law, the legislator must ensure that a bill complies with that mean-
ing—period.107  The legislator owes fidelity to the text, not to prece-
dent deviating from it.108 
 
the question how far legislative precedents, expounding the Constitution, ought to guide 
succeeding Legislatures and overrule individual opinions.”) (emphasis added). 
104 Id. at 391.  Madison repeatedly defended his 1816 support of the Bank on the ground 
that the pattern of political precedent overruled his individual judgment.  See, e.g, Letter 
from James Madison to C.E. Haynes (Feb. 25, 1831) reprinted in 9 WRITINGS OF JAMES 
MADISON 442–43 (Gaillard Hunt, ed.) (1910) [hereinafter Madison Letter to C.E. 
Haynes] (insisting that he had not changed his mind about the Bank’s constitutionality 
but rather acted consistently with his belief that settled political precedent “was an evi-
dence of the public will necessarily overruling individual opinions”); Letter from James 
Madison to George McDuffie, (May 8, 1830) reprinted in id. at 364–65 (“I am glad to find 
that the Report sanctions the sufficiency of the course and character of the precedents 
which I had regarded as overruling individual judgments in expounding the Constitu-
tion.”). 
105 Madison Letter to C.J. Ingersoll, supra note 103, at 392. 
106 See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 80, at 261 n.161 (“[I]f Madison is saying that concerns of 
mere stability and continuity trump an officeholder’s oath to support the Constitution, 
where he remains persuaded that the precedent is wrong, I emphatically disagree.”). 
107 For example, Senator Mike Lee promised to undertake independent constitutional analy-
sis with the following pledge: “I will not vote for a single piece of legislation that I can’t 
justify based on the original understanding of the Constitution, no matter what the Court 
 
32 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 19:1 
 
This position imagines the legislator, like the Supreme Court Jus-
tice in the standard hypothetical, facing a diametrical choice between 
the best interpretation yielded by her independent analysis of the 
text and conflicting precedent.  Yet it over-reads the legislator’s duty 
to be faithful to the text to maintain that she must independently an-
alyze every constitutional provision implicated by a proposed meas-
ure. 
C.  Super Precedent and Congressional Agenda Control 
Part II explained that the rules of adjudication keep super prece-
dent off the Court’s agenda; by narrowing the questions presented to 
the Court they effectively instruct the Court not to engage in inde-
pendent analysis of every constitutional issue.  The Court directs its 
attention to contested issues, effectively assuming that precedent set-
tling related constitutional questions is correct.109  It can thus avoid 
deciding whether precedent is right or wrong. 
The rules of adjudication obviously do not apply in Congress, but 
Congress, like the Court, has the power to narrow the questions it 
addresses for the sake of efficiency and stability.  To be sure, if Con-
gress is considering a bill, and there is no precedent on point, it can-
not avoid deciding the constitutional issue from scratch.  But when 
settled precedent exists—and in particular, precedent so well settled 
it qualifies as super precedent—Congress can adopt a working pre-
 
says you can do.”  Mike Lee, U.S. Senator‐Elect, Address at the 2010 Federalist Society Na-
tional Lawyers Convention (Nov. 19, 2010) (audio/video available at http://www.fed‐ 
soc.org/publications/pubid.2020/pub_detail.asp) (quoted in Alicea, Stare Decisis in an 
Originalist Congress, supra note 22, at 799).  Mike Paulsen has also emphasized the fidelity 
that the President owes to the document rather than to the Court’s interpretation of it.  
See Paulsen, supra note 80, at 267 (“The Constitution is paramount law; the President of 
necessity must interpret the law in the course of performing his constitutional duties to 
‘take care’ that the laws be ‘faithfully executed’; therefore, where, in the performance of 
his duties, the President finds a statute contrary to the Constitution as paramount law, he 
must follow the Constitution and refuse to give effect to the statute.”).  Later, Paulsen 
hedges with a concession that the President may, consistent with the oath, defer to an in-
terpretation at odds with the document when “it is clearly futile to [adhere to the correct 
interpretation] and when doing so would cause serious damage to the nation.”  Id. at 339.  
This concession appears to be a pragmatic one in the vein of Justice Scalia’s “faint heart-
ed” originalism, for Paulsen does not identify the textual or structural arguments that 
would justify the President in deviating from the law. 
108 See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting Influence of Precedent, 22 CONST. 
COMMENT 289 (2005) (arguing that adherence to precedents is unjustifiable). 
109 If the issues not before the Court do not involve its own precedent, the Court assumes 
that those issues were correctly settled by some other actor—for example, the lower 
court, if its holding on a related matter was not contested, or Congress, if the constitu-
tionality of a related statute was not challenged. 
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sumption that the precedent is constitutional.  That presumption can 
take some issues off the table entirely (making it unnecessary, for ex-
ample, for the Senate to spend one second considering the constitu-
tional status of West Virginia before seating its newly elected sena-
tors) and provide an efficient way to resolve issues that are flagged 
(for example, permitting Congress to take the incorporation of the 
First Amendment against the States as given in exercising its Section 
Five power).  In other words, Congress can employ this presumption 
to reduce both its issue-spotting and merits-resolving burdens, and it 
can do so consistent with the demands of both the oath and the text. 
This insight has implications for Congress’s treatment of all prec-
edent, not just super precedent.  Still, the case for taking precedent 
as given is not only strongest for super precedent (for example, one 
could imagine an argument that the presumption is unreasonable if a 
precedent is new or has been subject to unrelenting challenge), but it 
is, for our purposes, also much more significant.  Super precedent is 
what poses the supposedly intractable problem for originalism, be-
cause it is super precedent that ostensibly forces even the originalist 
to concede that an errant interpretation can sometimes virtually 
amend the text.  That is the claim we dispute. 
Presuming that a precedent is correct is different from endorsing 
its correctness.110  If a precedent is erroneous, the latter course gives 
priority to the precedent rather than the text.  The former course is a 
technique for avoiding the question whether the precedent is wrong 
or right.  This is a permissible technique, because Congress’s duty to 
comply with the Constitution does not oblige it to engage in an inde-
pendent analysis of every constitutional question.  It can adopt a 
working presumption that prior decision-makers got it right and look 
behind precedent only when it has reason to do so. 
Before we proceed further, it is worth observing that we should 
probably not think about Congress’s relationship to “Supreme Court 
precedent,” including “super precedent,” monolithically.  It is com-
mon for the judicial supremacy literature to frame the question as 
whether Congress must treat “Supreme Court opinions” as binding.  
But Supreme Court opinions address a wide range of constitutional 
issues, and the deference due may vary with the topic addressed. 
The proposition that a branch possessing independent interpre-
tive authority may defer to, and sometimes altogether refrain from 
evaluating, the choices made by a coordinate branch is unexceptional 
 
110 Nor does a presumption of correctness mean that the precedent itself is the law. 
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in the judicial context.111  The Court, after all, has a fairly aggressive 
view of its own interpretive authority, yet it nonetheless embraces the 
proposition that the political question doctrine sometimes restrains it 
from evaluating the constitutionality of the actions of a coordinate 
branch.  The Court also varies the level of scrutiny it applies in judi-
cial review based partly upon its assessment of Congress’s relative 
competence.  Rational basis review under the Commerce Clause, for 
instance, rests in part on the judgment that fact-driven determina-
tions like whether regulated activity “substantially affects” interstate 
commerce are particularly well suited to legislative resolution. 
Such deference might run both ways.  Could Congress reasonably 
conclude that it should give more deference to Supreme Court deci-
sions that rely heavily on technical legal analysis than to those incor-
porating factual assumptions?  If the Constitution commits some de-
cisions exclusively to, say, the Senate in the case of impeachment, 
might it not commit some decisions exclusively to the judiciary? 
Pursuit of these questions lies beyond the scope of this Article.  
For now, we make two points.  First, the subject matter of a Supreme 
Court opinion might affect what is required of Congress in interpret-
ing the Constitution—the subject matter itself may be a reason why 
Congress need not or cannot give an issue the equivalent of de novo 
review.  Second, a commitment to departmentalism does not itself 
demand the conclusion that Congress must render independent 
judgment on every question of constitutional interpretation that the 
Court has already addressed.  As the judicial context makes clear, in-
terpretive autonomy and deference—even absolute deference on se-
lected matters—can comfortably coexist. 
We now turn to the feature of congressional decision-making that 
is our principal concern: Congress’s ability to give super precedent—
both the Court’s and its own—a presumption of constitutionality.  A 
presumption of constitutionality is familiar in the judicial context.  
Rooted in the respect due a coordinate branch, it promotes restraint 
in the exercise of judicial review.112  Just as the Court affords statutes a 
presumption of constitutionality, Congress should perhaps give Su-
 
111 Cf. Hartnett, supra note 96, at 156 (defending the proposition that Congress owes Su-
preme Court opinions deference with analogy to the deference that the Court gives to 
the constitutional decisions of the other branches). 
112 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000) (“Due respect for the decisions of 
a coordinate branch of Government demands that we invalidate a congressional enact-
ment only upon a plain showing that Congress has exceeded its constitutional bounds.”); 
ABNER S. GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION: THE MULTIPLE SOURCES OF AUTHORITY IN A 
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 248–51 (2012) (examining the varying levels of deference that the 
Court has given to congressional interpretations of the Constitution). 
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preme Court opinions the benefit of the doubt when it undertakes to 
evaluate their merits.113  But Congress can employ the presumption 
for a different, albeit related, function: as a reason for not undertak-
ing independent analysis of a constitutional issue in the first place.  
When either the Court or predecessor public officials have already 
addressed an issue, and the resulting decision is so deeply settled that 
its reversal is unthinkable, Congress can choose to operate on the as-
sumption that the prior decision-makers got it right.  Such an as-
sumption does not preclude Congress’s ability to revisit the issue lat-
er.  It simply permits Congress to avoid having to make its own judg-
judgment now. 
Congress’s possession of “the legislative power” gives it authority 
over its agenda, and nothing in the Constitution prohibits it from us-
ing this authority to avoid engaging the merits of well-settled prece-
dents.  Reading the Constitution to impose such a requirement would 
be odd, given that the duty of constitutional fidelity does not override 
the flexibility that the Court enjoys in that regard.  Consider that 
while some originalists insist that stare decisis is unconstitutional, we 
are unaware of any who have maintained that the rules of adjudica-
tion that filter such questions off of the Court’s agenda are unconsti-
tutional.  Rules like sticking to the question presented permit the 
Court to assume arguendo that related matters were correctly decided 
(by Supreme Court precedent, another institutional actor, or the 
court below) and render judgment based upon the issue or issues ac-
tually contested by the litigants.  Supreme Court Justices take the 
same oath and owe the same duty of fidelity to the Constitution.  Yet 
no one maintains that the Court violates this duty by bracketing some 
questions in the course of deciding others. 
So too for Congress.  When a favored measure raises an open con-
stitutional question, Congress must resolve it before proceeding.  But 
Congress can decide to treat the existence of well-settled precedent as 
grounds for taking the merits of a constitutional question off its 
agenda. 
The constraint of time supports the prudence of this approach.  
Bickel recognized that the Supreme Court’s ability to decide constitu-
tional questions was limited by “the sheer necessity of limiting each 
 
113 Cf. Hartnett, supra note 96, at 154–55 (arguing that the executive branch should give Su-
preme Court opinions a presumption of constitutionality in evaluating them); Paulsen, 
supra note 80, at 332–33 (rejecting the proposition that the executive branch owes Su-
preme Court opinions any deference but maintaining that it ought to review Supreme 
Court opinions with “humility”). 
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year’s business to what nine men can fruitfully deal with.”114  Similarly, 
each Congress operates with a limited amount of time until its au-
thority ends.  It would be an exceedingly poor use of resources for 
Congress to resolve every possible constitutional issue from scratch 
every time.  Legislative business would grind to a halt, and members 
of Congress would find their attention directed toward questions that 
no one wants them to ask. 
Legislative attention is focused by constituent pressure.  Constitu-
ents—which is to say, all of us—are likely to seek or oppose congres-
sional action based on an undefined mixture of concerns, with policy 
outcomes likely to greatly outweigh constitutional requirements.  The 
many issues that compete for limited public attention mean that 
many constitutional precedents are unlikely to generate much popu-
lar interest.  In the case of a super precedent, which is by definition a 
decision that public and private actors treat as settled beyond doubt, 
there is no political pressure for reconsideration.  By contrast, if there 
is enough political pressure to revisit even a seemingly settled consti-
tutional precedent, then the precedent fails to qualify as a super 
precedent, and it is freed from the claims that attach to super prece-
dents (and only super precedents). 
As a practical matter, then, the People determine whether Con-
gress is likely to initiate the process of correcting a deeply rooted 
constitutional error.115  A member of Congress can attack a venerable 
constitutional precedent, but the oath of fidelity to the text does not 
oblige her to do so.  And if she moves to reconsider a precedent that 
is accepted by her constituents, she proceeds at her electoral peril. 
James Madison’s explanation for his ultimate acquiescence in the 
constitutionality of the Second Bank of the United States contains the 
seed of the idea for which we argue here: when another institutional 
actor has settled a constitutional question, an elected representative 
can (and as a practical matter, must) be responsive to the public in 
 
114 BICKEL, supra note 64, at 128. 
115 In considering whether the People have an obligation to press for the correction of con-
stitutional error, it is worth noting that the People are not generally bound by an oath to 
support the Constitution.  Natural born citizens do not take an oath to uphold the Con-
stitution, but naturalized citizens do.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1448 (2012) (“A person who has ap-
plied for naturalization shall, in order to be and before being admitted to citizenship, 
take in a public ceremony . . . an oath (1) to support the Constitution of the United 
States . . . .”).  Some groups of citizens—for example, certain federal employees—also 
take an oath.  See 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (2012) (providing that “[a]n individual, except the Pres-
ident, elected or appointed to an office of honor or profit in the civil service or uni-
formed services” must take an oath swearing  to “support and defend the Constitution of 
the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic” and “to bear true faith and 
allegiance to the same”). 
Oct. 2016] CONGRESSIONAL ORIGINALISM 37 
 
deciding whether to reopen it.  Madison vetoed the bill proposing to 
charter the Second Bank the first time it came to him, but he empha-
sized that he did so on policy rather than constitutional grounds.  In 
his veto message to the Senate in 1815, he stated: 
Waiving the question of the constitutional authority of the Legislature to 
establish an incorporated bank as being precluded in my judgment by 
repeated recognitions under varied circumstances of the validity of such 
an institution in acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of 
the Government, accompanied by indications, in different modes, of a 
concurrence of the general will of the nation . . . .116 
Madison viewed the question of the Bank’s constitutionality as 
“waived.”  He did not concede the constitutionality of the Bank; ra-
ther, he regarded the question as no longer being on the table.117  As 
he explained to Representative Ingersoll years later in justifying his 
decision to ultimately sign legislation chartering the Bank, “[the most 
ardent theorist] will find it impossible to adhere, and act officially 
upon, his solitary opinions as to the meaning of the law or Constitu-
tion . . . when no prospect existed of a change of construction by the 
public or its agents.”118 
One could understand Madison to be saying that the public and 
its agents established a precedent that subsequent office holders must 
treat as controlling law.  But one could also understand Madison to 
be saying, as he did in his earlier veto message, that public acquies-
cence in precedent waives the question—the office holder thus has 
no duty to answer it but can rather treat it as presumptively correct.  
We think the latter reading of Madison is the better way of thinking 
about the relationship between precedent and the duty of fidelity to 
the Constitution.  That reading also squares with Madison’s humble 
recognition that a “solitary opinion”—even his—may not be correct. 
Seventeen years later, President Andrew Jackson agreed that poli-
ticians ought to be responsive to the public in choosing which prece-
dents to challenge.  While Jackson refused to accept the Supreme 
Court’s conclusion that the Bank of the United States was constitu-
tional, he did not say that he would insist on his own interpretation of 
 
116 JAMES MADISON, VETO MESSAGE ON THE NATIONAL BANK (Jan. 30, 1815) 
http://millercenter.org/president/madison/speeches/speech-3626 (emphasis added).  
To be sure, Madison’s situation is different from the one upon which we focus for two 
reasons: he was explaining his conduct as President rather than as a Member of Congress, 
and it is doubtful that the constitutional status of the Bank of the United States qualified 
as a “super precedent” at the time.  Whether Madison was right or wrong to waive the 
question of the Bank’s constitutionality, however, his explanation is revealing. 
117 See Madison Letter to C.E. Haynes, supra note 104, at 442–43 (defending his position on 
the Bank as a necessary consequence of the circumstances at the time). 
118 Madison Letter to C.J. Ingersoll, supra note 103, at 392. 
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the Constitution in every circumstance.  “Mere precedent is a dan-
gerous source of authority,” Jackson explained, “and should not be 
regarded as deciding questions of constitutional power except where the 
acquiescence of the people and the States can be considered as well settled.”119 
Most recent commentary on Jackson’s statement emphasizes its 
general condemnation of precedent; we are more interested in Jack-
son’s exception for popular acquiescence.  To be sure, regarding 
public acquiescence as “deciding questions of constitutional power” 
might mean that widespread support creates constitutional meaning, 
legally supplanting the text when contrary to it.  Maybe that’s what 
Jackson meant; more likely, he just didn’t think it through.120  Regard-
less, the common sense view that an elected representative ought not 
choose to challenge precedent that constituents have overwhelmingly 
accepted, or even embraced, is consistent with our position that pub-
lic acquiescence in a constitutional precedent can legitimately relieve 
an elected official of asking the question rather than compelling her 
to give the wrong answer to it.  Jackson’s explanation suggests that 
the official should be judicious in determining which constitutional 
questions she can, consistent with the oath, avoid.  Public debate 
about the legitimacy of precedent may make it unreasonable for the 
official to treat the precedent as presumptively constitutional. 
While Presidents have traditionally been the focus of the fidelity 
versus precedent debate, members of Congress have taken similar po-
sitions.  David Currie observes that throughout the nineteenth centu-
ry—when, as he describes it, everyone was an originalist121—members 
 
119 Andrew Jackson, Veto Message (July 10, 1832), in 3 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND 
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1139, 1144–45 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897) (emphasis 
added).  Years later, Abraham Lincoln drew on Jackson’s distinction to defend his refusal 
to acquiesce in the Supreme Court’s then-recent interpretation of the Constitution in 
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (holding that a descendant of African 
slaves cannot be a “citizen” within the meaning of the Constitution and opining that 
Congress lacked the power to outlaw slavery in United States territories); see also Abraham 
Lincoln, Speech on the Dred Scott Decision at Springfield, Illinois (June 26, 1857), in ABRAHAM 
LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1832–1858 390, 393 (1989) (asserting that when a 
precedent has been, inter alia, “affirmed and re-affirmed through a course of years, it then 
might be, perhaps would be, factious, nay, even revolutionary, not to acquiesce in it as a 
precedent”). 
120 Jackson, unlike Madison, was not confronting a precedent he considered well-settled.  
Jackson made this observation in the course of defending his view that the Bank’s consti-
tutionality was a matter of dispute despite the Court’s holding in McCulloch.  The same 
was true of Lincoln’s resistance to Dred Scott.  See Lincoln, supra note 119, at 401 (asserting 
that Dred Scott’s interpretation of the Constitution was recent and disputed). 
121 CURRIE, supra note 28, at xiii (“With the possible exception of a few radicals beyond the 
fringe on the question of slavery, just about everybody was an originalist during the peri-
od of this study.”). 
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of Congress treated originalism as “not inconsistent with a recogni-
tion that questions sometimes do get settled, for better or worse.”122  
Those “nineteenth-century interpreters made incessant appeals to 
precedent, whether, legislative, executive, or judicial.”123  Yet mem-
bers of Congress also emphasized that settled questions did not re-
quire further consideration.  During an 1862 debate regarding the 
constitutionality of establishing a federal Department of Agriculture, 
Maine’s Senator William Fessenden allowed that “[a]s an original 
question,” he would be likely to agree that Congress lacked the power 
to appropriate certain funds, “but there is such a thing as having a 
constitutional question settled by legislative construction, to such an 
extent at least that Senators feel compelled to follow the precedents 
that have been set, and are perfectly justified in following them, be-
cause they cannot be raised always in reference to matters of this de-
scription.”124  Likewise, by 1895, it was “utterly impossible that any 
question of constitutional law ever can be so settled” as the constitu-
tionality of national banking.125 
To be sure, there are abundant examples of Senators and Repre-
sentatives seeking to correct constitutional interpretations they deem 
mistaken, and these efforts typically claim fidelity to the Constitu-
tion’s true meaning rather than an erroneous interpretation.  But 
these efforts always respond to political desire to correct the mistake.  
For example, Congress has enacted statutes deliberately flouting Su-
preme Court precedent on politically controversial issues from partial 
birth abortion to Miranda rights to flag burning.126  Most recently, 
when Senator Mike Lee argued against funding the Affordable Care 
Act even after the Court upheld it—reasoning that “[w]hen we see an 
unconstitutional action, we need to call it out as such, and we need to 
do whatever we can to stop the Constitution from being violated”127—
he was responding to widespread popular opposition to the Afforda-
ble Care Act on policy grounds, as well as to the constitutional con-
cerns.  Additionally, even apart from trying to correct perceived er-
 
122 Id. at xiii n.7. 
123 Id. 
124 CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 2016 (1862) (statement of Sen. Fessenden). 
125 27 CONG. REC. 672 (1895) (statement of Rep. Boatner). 
126 See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 133 (2007) (upholding the Partial–
Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003); Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 431–32 (2000) 
(invalidating a federal statute which sought to allow the admission of voluntary confes-
sions, contra Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966)); United States v. Eichman, 496 
U.S. 310, 312 (1990) (holding that the Flag Burning Act was unconstitutional under the 
Court’s precedent in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989)). 
127 159 CONG. REC. S6771 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 2013) (statement of Sen. Lee). 
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rors that become a matter of public debate, Congress has resisted 
precedents that infringe upon its institutional prerogatives.128  In all 
of these instances, the issues at stake had political traction at the time 
Congress acted, undermining any claim to super precedent status. 
By contrast, there is a dearth of examples of members of Congress 
seeking to disrupt the entire constitutional terrain in an effort to root 
out error.129  Instead, when faced with a precedent that no one wants 
to question—and that has thus achieved “super” status—members of 
Congress have been willing to stipulate the precedent’s correctness 
and move on.  As Currie recounts, there were repeated admonitions 
during the course of nineteenth century constitutional debates that 
constitutional interpretation may become settled, even by congres-
sional or presidential action rather than the courts.130  Given the con-
straints imposed on congressional representatives generally, includ-
ing limited hours in the day and a responsibility to focus on issues 
important to constituents, it is hard to imagine that such stipulations 
violate the oath. 
The analogy to the Court’s control of its agenda is instructive.  
The Constitution does not compel the Court—whose primary func-
tion is the interpretation of texts—to unearth and correct every con-
stitutional error that may lurk in a case.  It would be strange, then, for 
the Constitution to require more of Congress.  To employ another 
 
128 For example, Congress continued to enact “legislative vetoes” even after the Supreme 
Court held them unconstitutional in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).  See Louis Fisher, 
The Legislative Veto: Invalidated, It Survives, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 273, 288 (1993) 
(observing that “Congress enacted more than two hundred new legislative vetoes” in the 
years following the Court’s decision in Chadha). 
129 Consider Senator Mike Lee’s recent book.  See generally MIKE LEE, OUR LOST 
CONSTITUTION: THE WILLFUL SUBVERSION OF AMERICA’S FOUNDING DOCUMENT (2015).  
Senator Lee is harshly critical of both the Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence 
and the failure of his congressional colleagues to take the Constitution seriously.  But 
when Lee outlines the changes that he recommends, he concentrates on tweaking exist-
ing federal programs or declining to extend them, rather than proposing to refashion the 
entire federal government in a manner that would be more consistent with his constitu-
tional vision.  See id. at 157–216 (describing how the courts, Congress, and the People can 
reclaim the Constitution). 
130 See, e.g., DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE JEFFERSONIANS, 1801–
1829 254 (2001) (quoting Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Dallas’s defense of the 
constitutionality of the Bank of the United States, specifically that “there must be a period 
when discussion shall cease and decision shall become absolute”); CURRIE, supra note 28, 
at 10 (quoting President Andrew Jackson’s claim in the context of federal support for in-
ternal improvements that “individual differences should yield to a well-settled acquies-
cence of the people and confederated authorities in particular constructions of the Con-
stitution on doubtful points”); id. at 17 (describing how President John Tyler bowed to 
longstanding precedent); id. at 19 (explaining that President James Polk declined to 
question a constitutional question settled by “long acquiescence”). 
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metaphor, there is ample precedent for the suggestion that a mem-
ber of Congress may serve as a repairman who will respond to any 
constitutional errors that she is called upon to fix.  But there is no 
precedent for the suggestion that a member of Congress must serve 
as a building inspector obliged to examine the entire body of federal 
law in search of latent constitutional flaws. 
There is a sense in which the presumption we propose is a con-
gressional version of Bickel’s passive virtues.  Bickel was concerned 
about the Court, and more recent scholarship has applied the passive 
virtues to administrative law.131  Congress too can exercise the equiva-
lent of the passive virtues.  Rather than employing judicial doctrines 
such as standing and mootness, Congress may rely on its broad agen-
da-setting discretion to time its consideration of constitutional ques-
tions.  Whatever the limits of that discretion are, using it to avoid re-
considering a super precedent does not exceed them. 
An extensive body of political science literature examines why and 
how the House and the Senate decide which issues receive their at-
tention.132  Political scientists have offered a number of agenda con-
trol theories, but they all agree that the decision is fundamentally po-
litical.133  Such a political understanding of agenda control is 
controversial with respect to the Supreme Court,134 but it is well suited 
 
131 See Sharon B. Jacobs, The Administrative State’s Passive Virtues, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 565, 621 
(2014) (arguing that government agencies employ methods of restraint similar to those 
used by the judiciary). 
132 See, e.g., GARY W. COX & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, SETTING THE AGENDA: RESPONSIBLE 
PARTY GOVERNMENT IN THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (2005) (arguing that legisla-
tors assign agenda power based on their party preferences); BRYAN D. JONES & FRANK R. 
BAUMGARTER, THE POLITICS OF ATTENTION: HOW GOVERNMENT PRIORITIZES PROBLEMS 
(2005) (describing how the government processes information and prioritizes problems); 
JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDA, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES (2d ed. 2011) (attempt-
ing to answer the question of how issues make their way onto the national agenda); 
STEVEN S. SMITH, PARTY INFLUENCE IN CONGRESS (2007) (explaining the role that political 
parties play in setting the congressional agenda). 
133 For example, “throughout all periods of congressional history from the end of Recon-
struction to the present, the majority party has maintained a secure grip on the floor 
agenda.”  Gary W. Cox & Mathew D. McCubbins, Agenda Power in the U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives, 1877–1986, in PARTY, PROCESS, AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN CONGRESS: NEW 
PERSPECTIVES ON THE HISTORY OF CONGRESS 144 (David W. Brady & Mathew D. 
McCubbins, eds., 2002). 
134 Bickel posited that it was legitimate for the Court to factor the likely public reaction into 
its calculation of the timing of constitutional decision-making.  Bickel’s primary concern 
was to reconcile the Warren Court’s constitutional interpretation with the frequently hos-
tile public response that the Court’s decisions received.  As later explained by his col-
league Anthony Kronman, Bickel believed that there were no principled rules governing 
the Court’s decision whether or not to exercise the passive virtues.  See Kronman, supra 
note 64, at 1588 (“According to what standard or principle should the Court decide when 
to exercise one or another of the techniques of abstention that comprise the passive vir-
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for the role of Congress.  Politics, rather than hard-and-fast rules, 
controls the timing of congressional challenges to super precedent.  
As a result, such challenges arise only arise when the consensus sup-
porting a super precedent crumbles. 
CONCLUSION 
Originalists have struggled to explain how public officials—from 
Supreme Court Justices, to Presidents, to members of Congress—can 
meaningfully follow “the law” when they treat nonoriginalist prece-
dents as authoritative.  The assumption of both originalists and their 
critics seems to be that originalism cannot be a viable constitutional 
theory if it would not be possible for the Supreme Court, for exam-
ple, to purify the United States Reports so that its contents faithfully 
reflect the original public meaning of the Constitution. 
Such a burden is too heavy for any constitutional theory.  The 
Constitution does not require the Supreme Court to correct every 
constitutional error, and it does not require Congress to do so either.  
It permits errors to exist until an institution in a position to do so—
the Court, Congress, or the President—decides that it is an oppor-
tune time to correct them.  In the case of Congress, that question of 
timing is driven by political calculations, which are largely dependent 
upon pressure from the People to question what had previously 
seemed unquestionable precedents.  In this sense, the People have 
power to initiate the process of correcting constitutional error—an 
observation consistent with the popular constitutionalist claim that 
the People have power to initiate constitutional change.135 
No constitutional theory, including originalism, needs to account 
for all constitutional law as it currently exists or explain how an office 
 
tues, and when instead to render final judgment?  Bickel’s answer is: According to no 
standard or principle at all, if by ‘principle’ we mean a firm rule or fixed procedure.”).  
As Bickel himself wrote, “the techniques and allied devices for staying the Court’s hand, 
as is avowedly true at least of certiorari, cannot themselves be principled in the sense in 
which we have a right to expect adjudications on the merits to be principled.”  BICKEL, 
supra note 64, at 51.  The suggestion that the Court should not be guided by principle in 
deciding whether or not to decide a constitutional question prompted Gerald Gunther to 
famously quip about Bickel’s “100% insistence on principle, 20% of the time.”  Gerald 
Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the “Passive Virtues”— A Comment On Principle and Expediency in 
Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1964); see also Monaghan, supra note 63, at 714 
(“Bickel’s claim of a judicial prerogative to manipulate jurisdictional doctrine so as to de-
ny the assertion of jurisdiction which is given drew intense fire.”). 
135 Our argument is limited to the power of the People to champion the correction of consti-
tutional error.  Popular constitutionalism makes a broader claim—that the People get to 
determine the meaning of the Constitution—which is distinct from the point that we 
make here. 
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holder could realistically go about correcting deeply rooted errors 
present in existing constitutional law.  Justice Scalia was right to say 
that originalists can be pragmatic about precedent.  But that pragma-
tism is not, as is commonly assumed, a choice to treat erroneous 
precedent as law superseding the text it purports to interpret.  The 
pragmatism is one of timing.  The office holder has the discretion to 
decide when the timing is right to correct the error.  Until then, the 
office holder—be it the Supreme Court through the rules of adjudi-
cation or Congress with a presumption of constitutionality—can, as it 
were, assume arguendo that certain settled precedents are correct. 
In this sense, the Constitution itself is pragmatic.  It would have 
been utterly unrealistic for the Framers or any succeeding generation 
to suppose that those in charge of interpreting and enforcing the 
Constitution would make no errors in doing so.  And it would have 
been utterly unrealistic to assume that some of those errors would not 
become firmly entrenched.  One way that the Constitution handles 
that problem is to permit error to exist, albeit uneasily, alongside the 
governing constitutional law.  Because it does not require office 
holders to rectify every error that they see, the Constitution permits 
errors to exist uncorrected.  That is an acceptable approach for 
originalists and nonoriginalists alike. 
The question whether settled precedents constitute “law” in a pos-
itivist sense is a complicated jurisprudential one that we do not tackle.  
We will simply make one observation relevant to that question.  
Whether or not one could say that precedent, including a deeply set-
tled erroneous precedent, constitutes “law,” both the Court and Con-
gress have consistently treated it as a different kind of law than the 
constitutional text itself.  The Court has asserted the authority to de-
part from its precedent, but it has never asserted the authority to de-
part from the Constitution.  Similarly, Congress has asserted the au-
thority to defy Supreme Court precedent, but it has never asserted 
the authority to defy the Constitution.  The unbroken practice in the 
United States is to treat interpretations of the Constitution, in con-
trast to the Constitution itself, as provisional and subject to change.136  
 
136 See Hartnett, supra note 96, at 146–59 (arguing that Supreme Court opinions do not con-
clusively settle the Constitution’s meaning); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as Bind-
ing Law and as Explanations for Judgments, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 43, 44  (1993) (arguing that 
our legal tradition is more consistent with treating judicial opinions as explanations for 
judgments than with treating them as the law itself); Steven G. Calabresi, The Tradition of 
the Written Constitution: Text, Precedent, and Burke, 57 ALA. L. REV. 635, 639 (2006) (drawing 
on history to argue that the Court is willing to abandon “even deeply seated precedents 
because it became persuaded they were unfaithful to the best reading of our constitu-
tional text, of its structure, or of the first principles embodied in that text”). 
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Even if constitutional interpretations are “law” from a jurisprudential 
point of view, we think an office holder could treat this provisional 
law as presumptively correct without betraying the commitment to 
treat the constitutional text as controlling when the question is 
called.  Nor is it inconsistent with that commitment to permit the of-
fice holder some discretion about when to answer the question. 
